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This thesis analyses inefficiencies in the healthcare market, by conducting a se-
ries of credence goods experiments to investigate how a naturalistic or neutral
framing affects participants’ honesty. This work is divided into three studies
that will address different aspects of the forces driving healthcare costs. In the
first study of this dissertation, a credence goods laboratory experiment with
two different framings is conducted, namely a naturalistic framing relating to
a medical environment and a neutral framing to investigate behavioural differ-
ences of a standard participant pool. Overall, it was found that medical framing
has a positive effect on honesty. The second study extends the analysis by ex-
amining the behaviour of medical professionals from a large general practition-
ers conference in Germany in an abstractly framed credence goods experiment.
Comparing the behaviour of students to medical professionals, it was found that
medical professionals behave, on average, more honestly than students. How-
ever, it was also found that medical professionals overtreat, significantly more
than students. Finally, the last study complements the two previous studies and
translates them into a larger framework by conducting laboratory experiments
with future health, law, engineering and accounting professionals. It was inves-
tigated in an experimental setting whether the behaviour of future professionals
is affected by a naturalistic framing that is relevant to their future profession.
Overall, it was found that naturalistic framings affect the group for which they
are relevant, more than the remaining groups.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On a daily basis, we trust and rely on experts to conduct a service that we
ourselves cannot perform. Car repairs, taxi rides in an unknown city, medical
treatments and dentist visits are all examples of occasions where we trust an
expert to deliver the appropriate service. Providing medical services is perhaps
one of the most important examples of an industry that relies highly on experts
services. We are aware of the spiralling healthcare cost around the globe; how-
ever, we have little understanding of the forces driving these costs. This work
seeks to better understand the factors that are responsible for the increasing
costs of health care, through behavioural economic laboratory experimenta-
tion. Specifically, this research investigates how experts and students behave in
framed experiments using abstract and naturalistic framing, with participant
pools containing students, medical and non-medical professionals.
The medical sector is not only important for the wellbeing of a nations
population; it also attracts a substantial amount of money from public spending.
For instance, total expenditure on health as a percentage of gross domestic
product has increased for numerous countries around the globe. For example, as
depicted in Figure 1.0.1, between 1995 and 2012 for countries such as Germany,
Austria, Australia or the US, total expenditure on health as a percentage of
gross domestic product has increased between 12% and 32% respectively.
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Figure 1.0.1: Total Expenditure on Health as a Percentage of GDP
Source: WHO (http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.75,
accessed on 22.03.2015)
Given the substantial growth rate over the last decade raises the question on
efficiency in the healthcare market, since over-prescription of pharmaceuticals
(Wilson et al., 1995) and over-servicing by visiting medical officers in Victorian
public hospitals1 have already been documented in Australia. Furthermore, it
can also be seen that in Austria and Germany, healthcare expenditure peaked
between 2009 and 2010 respectively, and is since declining, which is in contrast
to Australia and the United States. However, this is a misleading picture as
both countries had a relatively high nominal GDP growth rate, as compared to
the growth rate of health expenditure, which led to a decrease of total health
expenditure as a share of GDP. In Austria, it decreased from 11.0% to 10.8%
between 2010 and 20112 and in Germany, from 11.8% to 11.3% between 2009 and
20113 and was the actual reason for the reduction in total health expenditure
as depicted in Figure 1.0.1.
Goods and services such as medical treatments, car repairs, and taxi rides
1http://archive.audit.vic.gov.au/old/sr21/ags2101.htm
2http://www.statistik.at/web_en/statistics/health/health_expenditure/index.
html accessed on 6 June 2013.
3https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2013/04/
PD13_128_23611.html accessed on 6 June 2013.
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are all classified as credence goods in the economics literature. ‘Credence goods’
is the term that describes a situation in which the expert seller (he) knows more
about the quality of a good that a customer (she) needs, than the customer her-
self (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2009). Such asymmetries of information between
sellers and customers may give rise to inefficiencies. This thesis is analysing such
inefficiencies in a credence good market by conducting a series of computerised
economics experiments. In particular, this research is interested in honesty with
regards to the delivery of health care services by medical professionals. As far as
it is known, such experiments have never been done in a credence goods experi-
mental setting with medical professionals as participants and a medical framing
in the instructions. Extending the existing literature in this direction is im-
portant in increasing the external validity of these (highly application-relevant)
other studies. For example, Ansink and Bouma (2013) state that “it is not clear
whether and how subjects in the lab relate to, for instance, a ‘business’ or ‘Wall
Street’ frame. From this perspective, framing should be matched to a partici-
pant pool to which the frame applied” (p. 3). Therefore, this dissertation will
contribute to the understanding of differences between conventional laboratory
experiments, and experiments with real world participant pools and real world
framings.
This work is divided into three studies, which will address different aspects of
the forces driving healthcare costs. The first study (Chapter 3), which is based
on joint work with Uwe Dulleck, Rudolf Kerschbamer and Markus Schaffner, is
entitled The Experimental Economics of Credence Goods: The Effect of Med-
ical Framing. A credence goods laboratory experiment is conducted with two
different framings, namely a naturalistic framing relating to a medical environ-
ment and a neutral framing to observe the inefficiencies prevalent in credence
goods markets. For this study, a standard participant pool was invited. The
novelty of this section is the fact that it is the first time that, in a credence
goods experimental setting, a medical framing is used.
This study serves as a baseline to determine the effect of framing, that is,
how decisions of a common participant pool are impacted when we introduce a
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naturalistic framing. Due to the naturalistic component of the framing, it might
well be the case that the participants in the experiment alter their behaviour
compared to the neutral framing, because participants can better emotionally
connect to the task at hand. If this is the case, it would give a first indication if
the (more morally connoted) medical context can mediate dishonest behaviour
of experimental participants in a credence goods market. This provides us with
a first benchmark for the studies introduced in later chapters.
The second study (Chapter 4), entitled Medical Professionals as Partici-
pants in Credence Goods Experiments, is also based on joint work with Uwe
Dulleck, Rudolf Kerschbamer and Markus Schaffner. It extends the analysis in
Chapter 3 by examining the behaviour of medical professionals. It is the first
study that uses medical professionals from a large general practitioners’ confer-
ence in Hamburg as participants in a credence good experimental setting, to
examine one possible driving factor of the increasing healthcare cost around the
globe. Supplier-induced demand (SID) or in other words, to overtreat patients,
is often mentioned as a possible reason for the perpetual increase in healthcare
expenditure. Due to the difficulties of measuring SID directly, most studies ob-
serve the frequency of revisits to a doctor and apply an empirical analysis. The
approach in this study differs substantially to previous research investigating
SID, by conducting a laboratory experiment instead of an analysis with obser-
vational data. This research is analysing the decision of medical professionals
in an abstract-framed credence goods laboratory experiment. Utilising such an
approach allows us to observe medical professionals’ decisions, with respect to
undertreatment, overcharging and our main variable of interest, overtreatment.
It will therefore be of great interest to analyse results and see if those obtained
with students in the previous study are similar to the results with real medi-
cal professionals or whether medical professionals behave differently i.e. more
honestly.
The third study (Chapter 5), entitled Naturalistic framings and honesty
of future professionals: A triple experiment, is joint work with Uwe Dulleck,
Markus Schaffner and Benno Torgler. This study complements the two pre-
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vious studies and translates them into a larger framework. The existence of
ethical dilemmas regarding workplace incentives and professional practises or
unwritten rules to overcome these dilemmas is not only a problem in the med-
ical sector but also in other areas such as law. In the public eye, the image of
professions such as doctors and engineers are rated very highly, while lawyers or
politicians receive a less favourable assessment. It is interesting to observe if the
perception of the public is accurate when we analyse the behaviour of different
prospective professionals with respect to honesty in the experiment. Since the
professions we are interested often occupy important positions within society,
it is important to know if the people who self-select themselves as pursuing a
career in one of these professions possess the required traits, such as honesty, to
be successful. To analyse prospective professionals prior to their work experi-
ence is an advantage, as they have not yet learned the heuristics that could bias
their behaviour in this experiment. There is no other study that has utilised a
credence goods experiment with medical framing, a tax compliance experiment
with a public goods structure and a self-reporting task with an environmental
framing, all combined in one single experiment.
Overall this research finds that framing has a strong effect on participants in
the experiment. In particular, I find that naturalistic framings affect the group
for which they are relevant (e.g. medical framing for future health profession-
als) more than the remaining groups in the experiment. Furthermore, medical
professionals exhibit a more pro-social behaviour compared to students in the
experiment. Finally, it was found that accountants were the most honest future
professional participants in our experiment, while lawyers were the least honest
participants.
This work continues with a literature review (Chapter 2), followed by the
three aforementioned studies and concludes (Chapter 6) with remarks as well
as a discussion of the implication of the studies, provides some policy implica-
tion, emphasises some shortcomings and provides an outlook for future research
opportunities.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
A large fraction of the current approach to behavioural economics encompasses
laboratory experiments. The advantage of using laboratory experiments is the
fact that this is a controlled environment where we can control a number of
variables and isolate effects. This section elaborates on the experimental game
used, and gives a brief explanation of SID, some specifics regarding laboratory
experiments, the concept of framing in experiments, a very brief discussion
on other regarding preferences, as well as the experimental software that was
utilised.
2.1 Credence Goods
Darby and Karni (1973) were the first to introduce the term credence goods
and added it to Nelson’s (1970) classification of ordinary, search and experience
goods. Ordinary goods (such as rice) have well-known characteristics, and peo-
ple know where to obtain them. Search goods (like shoes) have to be examined
before buying, in order to observe their characteristics. Experience goods (like
wine) have unknown characteristics, but they are discovered after purchasing or
using them. The term credence good describes a situation in which an expert
knows more about the quality of a good a consumer needs than the consumer
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herself (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2009). One particular characteristics, that
differentiates a credence goods from the before mentioned goods, is the fact that
consumers cannot even be sure ex-post if they received the appropriate treat-
ment or not. The economic literature provides both anecdotal and empirical
evidence suggesting that undertreatment, overtreatment and overcharging are
important problems in the provision of expert services in many countries and
industries. In the medical context, Emons (1997) quotes a Swiss study stating
that the average person’s likelihood of receiving one of seven major surgical
interventions is one-third above that of a physician or a member of a physi-
cian’s family. This indicates that better informed and educated patients are
less likely to be offered or accept unnecessary and expensive surgical interven-
tions. Emons goes on to mention a study by the Federal Trade Commission that
documents the tendency of optometrists to prescribe unnecessary treatments.
Iizuka (2007) finds that doctors react to mark-up differences in the Japanese
drug prescription market where doctors often prescribe and distribute medica-
tions. Additionally, he also finds that physicians prefer to prescribe cheaper
drugs to patients. Gruber et al. (1999) show that the relative frequency of
caesarean deliveries, compared to normal child births, responds to the fee dif-
ferentials of health insurance programs. In support, Gruber and Owings (1996)
state that the frequency of caesarean section deliveries is negatively correlated
with birth rates. Hughes and Yule (1992) find that the number of cervical cytol-
ogy treatments is positively correlated with the fee for this treatment. Ju¨rges
(2007) and Fuchs (1978) indicate that a large share of patients’ demand for
health care services is supply-driven; physician density has a significant positive
effect on the number of doctor visits and operations. This confirms the previous
statement that overtreatment in expert-supplied healthcare adds considerably
to the overall expenses of the system.
Based on the standard assumption made in economics of own-money max-
imising preferences, these problems were addressed theoretically by several aca-
demic articles that aim to identify the conditions for the efficient provision of
2.1 Credence Goods 9
credence goods (see,e.g., Pitchik and Schotter, 1987; Wolinsky, 1993; Taylor,
1995; Glazer and McGuire, 1996; Emons, 1997, 2000; Su¨lzle and Wambach,
2005; Fong, 2005; Dulleck et al., 2011, 2014; Bester and Dahm, 2014; Dulleck
et al., 2015). These conditions are organised in a comprehensive survey pa-
per, published by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006). They describe markets for
credence goods by at least three interrelated characteristics, according to their
assumptions of the markets. They have to state (1) the technology of the sup-
pliers; (2) the degree of competition combined with the structure of the market;
and (3) the information structure of customer and courts. Additionally, their
survey paper provides a unifying framework into which the various approaches
and their predictions can be integrated (see Table 3 in Dulleck and Kerschbamer,
2006, p. 34). The model shows that two conditions are crucial for the efficient
provision of credence goods:
1) Liability (L)
The expert is required, by law or some other institution, to provide a good that
satisfies the customer’s needs. Liability prevents the problem of undertreatment,
but not necessarily the problems of overtreatment and overcharging.
2) Verifiability (V)
The customer is able to observe and verify the delivered product or service
ex-post. A patient may, for some medical treatments, be able to verify the
provided service, like taking an x-ray, while for others, like an operation under
anaesthetic, this may not be the case. Verifiability solves the problem of over-
charging, but not necessarily the problems of over - and undertreatment.
Standard theory predicts that without at least one liability or verifiability,,
experts will always provide the lowest quality (undertreatment) and charge for
the highest one (overcharging). This phenomenon leads to problems similar to
those in Akerlof (1970)’s “Market of Lemons” model in which the market will
break down due to the fact that goods traded in a market consisting of infor-
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mation asymmetry between a buyer and seller can degrade, hence, only leaving
lemons behind.
In a recent paper, Dulleck et al. (2011) were the first to study the deter-
minants for efficiency in a credence goods market by utilising a laboratory ex-
periment. Their experiment was conducted in a neutral or abstract credence
goods environment, i.e. an environment without any reference to the medical
sector or another real world credence goods situation. Also, the participants in
the experiment are students and not experts from the field. They observe that
if liability holds, the credence goods problem disappears but verifiability has,
at best, a minor effect. This empirical result is in contrast to the theoretical
result predicted by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006), where they suggested that
verifiability might be one way to overcome the credence goods dilemma. The re-
sults also demonstrated the limits of standard theory in explaining all observed
behaviour and that some institutions, identified in theory to solve the credence
goods problem, do not work in practice or at least in the laboratory. Apart
from their project, Huck et al. (2007, 2012) study markets of experience goods
and goods and services, which also involve problems of asymmetric informa-
tion but differ because the consumer finds out, after purchasing, which quality
she received. Huck et al. (2007, 2012) study the importance of trust in such
markets. The results presented in Dulleck et al. (2011) and Kerschbamer et al.
(2009) are complementary to the Huck et al. (2007, 2012)’s results and they
are the very first experimental studies on behaviour in credence goods settings.
Since then, a few more experimental studies for credence goods markets have
emerged. Huck et al. (2014) analysed in an experimental setting how medical
insurance and the free choice of a physician correlates with the overtreatment
of patients, and Balafoutas et al. (2015a) investigated tax evasion in a credence
goods laboratory experiment. A paper published by Beck et al. (2014) is the
first that used an artefactual field experiment1 in a credence goods experimental
1“An artefactual field experiment is the same as a conventional lab experiment but with a
nonstandard participant pool”(Harrison and List, 2004, p. 1014). In this case car mechanics.
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study to analyse the behaviour of car mechanics. They find that car mechan-
ics overtreat significantly more than students. Balafoutas et al. (2013) is one
of only a few field experiments aimed at analysing the determinants of fraud
in a credence goods market. They investigated taxi drivers in the Greek cap-
ital, Athens. Their results indicate that overtreatment (taking a detour) was
the main determinant of fraud, with 46% of passengers affected by it. Over-
charging (manipulating fares) only accounted for 11% of fraudulent behaviour.
Undertreatment (not reaching the requested destination) is not a problem in
this type of credence goods market, as it is very easily observed. Another con-
ducted field experiment is that of Schneider (2012), who investigated fraudulent
behaviour in a credence goods market for car repairs. He found that overtreat-
ment and undertreatment was of major concern. However, he goes on to state
that incompetence of the car mechanic cannot be ruled out to have caused these
results. The latest field experiment conducted in a credence goods market is
Balafoutas et al. (2015b) who look at second-degree moral hazard in taxi rides
in an unknown city. In their moral hazard treatment, passengers, in contrast
to their control treatment, particularly state that they need a receipt such that
they can get reimbursed by their employer. Their result suggests that passen-
gers in that condition are significantly more likely to pay a higher price than
passengers in the control treatment, where they only ask for a receipt. The
second-degree moral hazard problem is also very relevant in medical situations
where often insurance companies pay for the medical treatment costs, rather
than the patients themselves. Furthermore, Rasch and Waibel (2015) analyse
empirically the occurrence of overcharging in the market, for car repairs. They
find that the higher number of competitors in the vicinity lowers the incen-
tive to overcharge. This dissertation builds on the credence goods experimental
research by using the same design as in previous credence goods laboratory
experiments, however, this research extends the previous experiments by em-
ploying a naturalistic, specifically a medical framing in addition to the neutral
framing. Moreover, the participant pool consists not only of students, but also
of medical professionals from a general practitioners conference in Germany.
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2.2 Supplier-Induced Demand (SID)
Arrow (1963) contends that the information asymmetry between a doctor (ex-
pert) and a patient (consumer) promotes the problem of SID within the health-
care sector. SID is the term used in health economics to describe ‘services
ordered by a physician for a patient, that the patient would refuse if he or
she had the same medical knowledge and expertise as the physician’ (Hay and
Leahy, 1982). While most studies that analyse SID use an empirical approach
(Fuchs, 1978; Gruber and Owings, 1996; Gruber et al., 1999; Ju¨rges, 2007), this
research deviates from such an approach and investigates the behaviour of med-
ical professionals directly. Various reasons exist for the occurrence of SID in the
healthcare market. Kessler and McClellan (1996) state that the fear of doctors
being held liable for malpractice could be one reason why doctors choose to
overtreat patients, just to be in a safer position. Bickerdyke et al. (2002) state
two different reasons for the occurrence of SID, namely a physician’s self-interest
and the well-being of their patients. This thesis aims at better understanding
the motives and incentives and the resulting behaviour of health care providers
that cause such inefficiencies, by conducting an artefactual field experiment with
medical professionals from a large conference in Germany.
2.3 Experiments
In economics, the utilisation of laboratory experiments has emerged relatively
late when compared to other social sciences, such as psychology. Smith (1962)
was one of the first who used experimental economics to test market behaviour
in a classroom setting. Since then, experimental economics has come a long way.
In particular, laboratory experiments are used to analyse coordination games,
market games and auction games as well as social preferences.2
The majority of experiments conducted in the laboratory use university
2To analyse social preferences in different circumstances, games such as the dictator game,
ultimatum game, trust game or public goods game are utilised
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students as their participants, who are normally not experienced at the task
at hand, nevertheless, for most theoretical experiments investigating decision-
making in general that does not matter. On the other hand, for policy motivated
experiments it is important to know how professionals behave compared to a
general student population before implementing a policy change (see for exam-
ple Hannan et al., 2002, where experienced MBA students behave differently to
undergraduate students).
From psychology, we know that it is important how something is presented to
participants in experiments, as this can influence their decisions. Ariely (2008,
p.1) nicely shows an example for a subscription to The Economist where the
framing or presentation of the different subscriptions options determines the
selection that the marketing people at The Economist want people to choose.
Hence, it is important that the participants in experiments behave as natu-
rally as possible to avoid undesirable or biased results. Preventing such biased
behaviour is not always entirely possible, however, it can be minimised. Em-
ploying a neutral framing, for example, can help to overcome such a problem, as
participants cannot associate their behaviour in the experiment to a real world
decision and therefore they should not behave unnaturally.
However, a neutral framing might not always be the best solution to observe
participants’ behaviour in laboratory experiments. For policy-related experi-
ments, it might be important to have naturalistic framings relevant to the area
of the workforce that is to be examined or for which the policy ought to be im-
plemented. For experimental participants to be able to psychologically relate to
the situation at hand might possibly enhance a pro-social behaviour compared
to participants playing the same game but with a neutral framing. For instance,
the free rider problem might be overcome with a naturalistic framing. A key
sector where the behaviour of participants in the market plays an important
part for society is the medical sector. In the public perception, medical profes-
sionals are more honest and ethical than people working in many other jobs.
For example, interpreting the 2014 Gallup Poll question on honesty and ethics
in different fields, it can be seen that jobs in the medical sector are rated very
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positively compared to professions such as bankers or lawyers.3 But are med-
ical professionals living up to their public perception? Interestingly, not many
studies exist that use medical professionals or other workforce professionals of
different areas to answer such questions. As it is difficult to observe the be-
haviour of such professionals directly, laboratory experiments with an abstract
and naturalistic framing are a good way to overcome such obstacles.
Using real world participants is still not a very common practice in exper-
imental economics, in particular in experimental studies that focus on health
economics, and can therefore contribute to the discussion of external validity
of laboratory experiments (see Harrison and List, 2004, for a discussion on the
nature of the subject pool).
2.4 Framing in Experiments
The importance of framing, hence the style of presenting experimental results,
has been indicated by a large fraction of the literature (Andreoni, 1995; Dufwen-
berg et al., 2011; Ellingsen et al., 2012; Ga¨chter et al., 2009; Ku¨hberger, 1998;
Ku¨hberger et al., 1999; Levin et al., 1998; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 1986;
Tversky et al., 1990). Framing plays an important part in psychological and
economics experiments. In their seminal paper, Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
showed that preferences shift if the task that participants have to undertake is
framed positively or negatively. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) point out that
preferences between options should be independent of their representation, and
therefore, not violating the invariance axiom of expected utility theories.
Such preference reversals were first mentioned by Lichtenstein and Slovic
(1971). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explain this shift with Prospect The-
ory. For more papers on preference reversal, see Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973);
Grether and Plott (1979); Slovic and Lichtenstein (1983); Tversky et al. (1990)
to name just a few. For a meta-analysis on Asian disease-like studies see
Ku¨hberger et al. (1999). In their survey paper, Levin et al. (1998) define fram-
3http://www.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-professions.aspx
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ings that are concerned with providing information or describing situations in
either a positive or a negative attribute, valence framing. Levin et al. (1998)
go on to further break up valence framing into risky choice, attribute and goal
framing. Dufwenberg et al. (2011) describe label framing as a situation by
which participants are confronted with an equivalent task, same material incen-
tives but different wording. The paper written by Andreoni (1995) is a good
example of a paper that could be labelled as such. He conducted a public goods
experiment with two different framings, one with a positive and the other with
a negative framing. In the positive framing the participants’ choice is framed as
contributing positively to the public good, while in the negative framing, incen-
tives are identical to the positive framing; the participants’ choice is framed as
buying a private good that, since the opportunity cost is the acquisition of the
public good, leads to a negative outcome of the other participants. The result of
the experiment showed that participants are cooperating much more in a public
good experiment that is positively framed, compared to a public good experi-
ment that is negatively framed, even though the incentives of the experiment
have not changed. Andreoni (1995) explains this result with one hypothesis that
could be called pure altruism but is highly unlikely or an alternative hypothe-
sis, which he thinks is more likely, in that people get a warm-glow by behaving
nicely to other people. However, to obtain such a result the strength of the
warm glow needs to be greater than the cold prickle sensation of doing bad to
others. At the same time, though, Andreoni (1995) states that more research
needs to be undertaken to be able to affirm for certain that an asymmetry con-
cerning positive and negative externalities can be generalised to other aspects
of human interactions.
Deutsch (1958) in his seminal paper was the first to investigate trust by conduct-
ing an economics experiment. He showed that the choice behaviour of partici-
pants when playing a prisoner’s dilemma game depended heavily on whether the
instructions were framed to make participants feel individualistic or cooperative.
This is in line with Ellingsen et al. (2012), who in their first experiment showed
that the framing of different circumstances significantly affects the behaviour
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of participants in social dilemma situations. As Camerer (2003) expresses it,
“There is little doubt that describing games differently can effect behaviour;
the key step is figuring out what general principles (or theory of framing) can
be abstracted from labelling effects” (p. 75). In their neutrally and medically
framed experiment, Ahlert et al. (2008) found that economics students behave
less selfishly in the medical framing compared to the neutral framing. On the
other hand, medical students behaved more selfishly in the medical framing.
Their explanation is that economics students appear to obtain cold feed in the
unfamiliar medical framing, while for medical students, their professional norms
appear to emerge more clearly in the familiar framing, hence external validity
is of high importance as it could be the case that medical professionals are not
sensitive to a medical frame. This would indicate that we cannot rely as much
on moral suasion. Furthermore, Cooper et al. (1999) in their experiment con-
ducted with students and managers in China, use two different framings. One is
a neutral framing not related to the managers’ profession while the other fram-
ing - they call it context framing - is related to the profession of the managers.
They find that the context framing influenced the behaviour of the manager
much more compared to the neutral framing. They relate this to the fact that
managers could rely on past experience and similarities to their daily tasks at
work. In Chapter 3 a medical framing and a neutral framing are used in the
experiment conducted with student participants, while in Chapter 4 medical
professionals are used as participants in a neutral framing environment.4 As
Al-Ubaydli and List (2013) point out, ‘the best predictor of cheating rates in
the natural field experiment is behaviour in sterile laboratory treatments with
neutral language instructions’ (p. 33). Hence, the results of this research are
a valuable contribution to the credence goods, framing and artefactual field
experiment literature.
4Unfortunately, I was not able conduct the medical framing experiment with medical pro-
fessionals due to difficulties recruiting medical professionals for my experiment at the medical
conference in Germany.
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2.5 Other Regarding Preferences
Recent economic research shows that the behaviour of people, including experts,
may be motivated by an intrinsic desire to solve their customer’s problem (Frey,
1997) and/or by a preference for honesty (Brandts and Charness, 2003; Char-
ness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Gneezy, 2005; Alger and Renault, 2007; Mazar and
Ariely, 2006; Severinov and Deneckere, 2006); they also might have a desire for
efficiency (Charness and Rabin, 2002) and/or a concern for how the seller’s util-
ity compares to the customer’s (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000). Additionally, the behaviour of people could be influenced by aversion
to guilt (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Ellingsen et al., 2010). While those
types of preferences are modelled theoretically and found to be relevant empir-
ically, no research exists that answers the question whether and to what extent
real world experts in the health sector are driven by such motives. Previous
theoretical research (Kerschbamer et al., 2009, 2015) has developed a theory
of behaviour of experts with such non-standard preferences. Their findings
show that other-regarding preferences can dramatically change the predictions
of provision behaviour of medical goods and credence goods in general. Eckel
and Gintis (2010) state that other regarding preferences are driven by social
norms, and social norms are environment specific. This is particular important
for the experiments in Chapter 3 and 5, in which experiments with context spe-
cific environments such as a medical framing, an environmental framing and a
tax compliance framing are included. Participants in before-mentioned exper-
iments are perhaps behaving more honestly as they believe this is the socially
appropriate behaviour.
2.6 Experimental Software
This section discusses the experimental software that was used to conduct all ex-
perimental sessions at the University of Innsbruck (IBK ), a medical conference
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in Hamburg (Deutsche Gesellschaft fu¨r Allgemeinmedizin und Familienmedizin
(DEGAM 2014)) and at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT ).
For this thesis, a new experimental software named CORAL is used (Schaffner,
2013), which is a lightweight framework for experimental economic experiments.
CORAL is a HTML Velocity and Java-based program that allows for a more
up-to-date design of an experimental environment compared to previous ex-
perimental software, such as zTree developed by Fischbacher (2007). One of
CORAL’s advantages is that it is an open-source software, which breaks down
the experiment to a simple step-by-step execution of templates or script files
(see Schaffner, 2013, for a detailed introduction of CORAL) or the homepage
that was particularly created for new users5.
5https://github.com/mas802/coral-econ








Framing plays an important part in economic and psychological decision making
experiments, as it can alter a participant’s behaviour in certain situations. In
their seminal paper, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) have shown that partici-
pants shift their preferences if the task is either framed positively or negatively.
Furthermore, Cooper et al. (1999) find that in an experiment conducted with
students and managers in China, the context framing, which was relating to
the managers’ profession, influenced the behaviour of the managers much more
compared to the neutral framing, while for students it did not matter much.
They relate this to the fact that managers could rely on past experience and
similarities to their daily tasks at work. Supporting their result is a recent study
by Cohn et al. (2014), who find that banking professionals behave less honestly
if the framing of the experiment relates to a financial environment compared to
a neutral framing. This confirms the perception that the banking environment
weakens and undermines the morally desired behaviour of honesty in employees.
In this chapter, it is of interest whether participants behave differently when a
medical framing to which they can relate is applied. The novelty of this chapter
is the framing of the experiment. As far as it is known, this research is the first
to apply a medical framing in a credence goods experiment. Additionally, in
contrast to Dulleck et al. (2011), a strategy method is also applied in our experi-
ment. It is found that in this baseline treatment, students undertreat, overtreat
and overcharge significantly less (p < 0.01) in medical framing than in neutral
framing. Specifically, it is observed that in medical framing, undertreatment is
45 percentage points less likely to occur than in neutral framing. However, when
liability or verifiability is introduced, the effect of medical framing is much less
apparent. The reminder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 3.2 the
methodology of the paper is discussed. Section 3.3 describes the experimental
design. The results are presented in Section 3.4 and last, Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Model and Methodology
3.2.1 Baseline
A simplified version of the Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) credence goods
model will be the commencing point of this study. In this game, there are two
players: an expert seller S (he) and a consumer C (she). In a first step, the
expert seller posts two prices, a price ph for the high quality service and a price pl
for the low quality service, with ph ≥ pl. The consumer gets to know these prices
and decides if she wants to interact with the expert seller or not. If she decides
not to interact in the market, no trade takes place and both players receive the
outside option of o ≥ 0. If the consumer decides to stay in the market, nature
determines with probability h that she needs the high quality treatment and
with probability 1 − h the low quality one. The expert learns about the needs
of the consumer and provides either the high quality treatment th or the low
quality treatment tl, where th incurs costs of ch and tl of cl respectively, with
ch ≥ cl. In the last decision, the expert charges one of the prices he previously
defined for the respective treatment. The customer receives a payoff v > 0 if the
service provided by the expert was sufficient (i.e. if she needs the high quality
and obtains the high quality, or she requires the low quality and either receives
the high quality or the low quality) or zero otherwise. The customer has to
pay the price of the service regardless of receiving the sufficient or insufficient
quality provided by the expert. More formally, let θ ∈ {l, h} be the index of
a customer’s type of problem, δ ∈ {l, h} be the index for the quality of the
treatment provided and let γ ∈ {l, h} be the index of the quality of treatment
actually charged for. The material payoffs of the expert seller piS and consumer
piC are therefore as follows:
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piS(p
l, ph, δ, γ) = pγ − cδ (3.1)
piC(p
l, ph, θ, δ, γ) =
 −pγ if θ = h and δ = l,vθ − pγ otherwise. (3.2)
Figure 3.2.1 illustrates the sequence of decisions in this game and the payoffs
provided to each player.
In the following, the basic setup is extended and some institutional restric-













































not available in L
not available in V
seller posts price
customer enters or not
nature determines the severity of the problem
seller treats
seller charges
Figure 3.2.1: Game Tree
3.2 Model and Methodology 23
3.2.2 Adding Institutional Restrictions: Liability and Ver-
ifiability
The liability condition in credence goods markets infers that expert sellers al-
ways provide the required quality that solves the consumer’s problem. Liability
does therefore prevent the problem of undertreatment ; it does not, however,
preclude the problem of overcharging or overtreatment. Imposing the verifi-
ability condition on the other hand, can prevent the problem of overcharging
because consumers can observe and verify ex-post the quality provided by the
seller (however, without knowing if it was the appropriate one), but it does not
preclude the problems of undertreatment or overtreatment.
The two institutional restrictions liability and verifiability and all the com-
binations create four different sets of possible actions for the expert seller.
The four conditions are treatment B (Baseline where neither liability nor
verifiability holds), treatment L (where liability but no verifiability holds), treat-
ment V (where only verifiability but no liability holds), treatment LV (where
liability and verifiability hold (no experiments were conducted in this treatment
due to the fact that in the paper published by Dulleck et al. (2011) no ad-
ditional information could be won from this treatment, because adding more
institutional restrictions reduces fraud in the first place since it leaves partici-
pants with less choices. Furthermore, it also allowed us to maximise the number
of participants in the remaining treatments.). These treatments are carried out
similar to Dulleck et al. (2011) but this study varies the framing of the experi-
ment from a neutral to a medical framing. Additionally, in contrast to Dulleck
et al. (2011) a strategy method is also used in all the experiments. To be exact,
only a strategy method for the player that was allocated the role of the seller
or doctor was implemented. Hence, we obtained for every round an observation
on the decision made by the expert seller on the treatments he would have pro-
vided and the price chosen, even for the cases when the consumer decided not
to participate in the market.
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3.3 Experimental Design
In the medical framing the same experimental design is followed as in the neutral
framing (see Figure 3.2.1 (Game Tree) in previous section), however, the text
differs substantially. The text for the experimental participants in baseline
medical reads as follows: there are two players, a doctor (he) and a patient
(she). The doctor chooses a price for the normal intravenous drip or the special
intravenous drip. The patient is informed about the prices posted by the doctor
and can decide if she wants to be examined or not. If not, this round ends.
If they do, the doctor conducts a diagnosis in which he learns for certain the
severity of the illness of the patient.1 The doctor charges a price, specified
in decision 1, from the patient for administering an intravenous drip. The
price charged does not necessarily have to be the price for the intravenous drip
actually chosen by the doctor in decision 3; it can also be the price of the other
intravenous drip (for a complete set of instructions on the neutral and medical
framing experiment see Appendix D.1).
3.3.1 Experimental Treatments
The three conditions in the neutral as well as in the medical framing constitute
a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design, where the first ‘2’ relates to the framing of the
problem neutral or medical; the second and third ‘2’ relate to whether liability
and/or verifiability applies. Dulleck et al. (2011) and Kerschbamer et al. (2009)
found in previous experiments the following values well suited for their analysis.
In all treatments, this study let the customer’s likelihood of requiring the major
treatment be h = 0.5, and the value of sufficient treatment be v = 10. The
costs of providing the minor, respectively major, treatments are cl = 2, and ch
= 6. The prices posted by the sellers, pl and ph are integers from an interval
I ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 11} with pl ≤ ph. The outside option, if no trade takes place
between the seller and the customer, is set to o = 1.6. Therefore, for this
1For simplicity we assume a diagnosis is free of charge.
3.3 Experimental Design 25
project, the same strategy is followed.
The plan is to run all treatments with a total of 16 periods. Due to the
repetition of the stage game, the matching of subjects is very important. It
must not be possible for any seller to build up a reputation in the course of the
repeated interaction (see Dulleck et al., 2011, for a credence goods experiment
with reputation). This prohibits the use of a partner matching (in which a seller
is matched with the same customer in all 16 periods) in all treatments; in fact
a stranger matching is employed, in which customers and sellers are randomly
rematched after each period. This will considerably reduce the ability to build
up reputation but it cannot be completely ruled out since there is not a perfect
stranger matching. In all treatments, eight subjects are in the role of customers
(patients), and eight in the role of sellers (doctors). The assignment to roles
is randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment, and roles are kept
fixed throughout the entire experiment. Subjects are informed about the size
of matching groups in each treatment. Hence subjects know that the probabil-
ity of being matched with a specific trading partner in a specific round is one
quarter. However, in all treatments, customers cannot identify sellers. Each
matching group yields one statistically independent observation. The experi-
ments were conducted in Austria at the University of Innsbruck in the winter
semester 2012/2013 and October 2014.
3.3.2 Experimental Procedure
All experimental sessions were conducted using CORAL (Schaffner, 2013).2 Re-
cruiting was done with ORSEE in the winter semester 2012/2013 (Greiner,
2015) and hroot in October 2014 (Bock et al., 2012). A total of 240 (= 15× 16)
students participated in the experiment conducted in 2012/2013 and 2014. Two
sessions were run with neutral framing in condition B,L and V, since this is
2For a detailed introduction of CORAL or to have a look at the homepage that was partic-
ularly created for new users see Schaffner (2013) or https://github.com/mas802/coral-econ
respectively.
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only a replication of Dulleck et al. (2011), and three sessions with medical fram-
ing, which is the novelty of this study, in condition B,L and V. In all sessions
we started with reading out the instructions to the participants. We emphasised
in the instructions that all participants receive the same information3. The av-
erage session length was around 50 minutes. All participants in the experiment
received an initial endowment of 10 points to start with and an exchange rate
of 4 points equal to 1 euro was applied in the experiments. The average total
payoff was 10.8 euro (sd = 4.22) in the medical framing and 10.1 euro (sd =
4.52) in the neutral framing environment.
3.3.3 Theoretical Predictions 4
Standard economic theory assumes that both sellers and consumers are ratio-
nal, risk neutral and own-money-maximising agents and that this is common
knowledge. The equilibrium concept we apply is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
since we have a dynamic game with incomplete information. Our focus lies on
symmetric equilibria.
PR1 (BN: Baseline - Neutral Framing): In markets without liability
and/or verifiability (condition BN & BM), standard economic theory predicts
that the expert seller would always provide the low treatment tl and charge
the customer for the high treatment th under each price vector. By knowing
this, the customer would never enter the market if ph > 3. However, with
such a low ph not even sellers that cheat (i.e undertreat) would make a profit
(ph − cl ≤ 3− 2 = 1 < 1.6 = o) and therefore, we would expect to see a market
collapse since there is no price such that a seller and a customer would interact
and obtain at least as much as the outside option. Hence, we would assume
to observe a market breakdown similar to the market for lemons described by
Akerlof (1970). In other words undertreatment is a considerable inefficiency
concern in the baseline condition. Additionally, overtreatment and overcharging
3See Appendix D.1.1 and D.1.2 for the experimental instructions for condition BN & BM.
4Taken from Dulleck et al. (2011) except for baseline medical framing.
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are going to be an inefficiency concern in condition BN as well. Hence, the
three inefficiency concerns in condition BN are undertreatment, overtreatment
and overcharging.
PR2 (BM: Baseline - Medical Framing): Consider condition BM
with Medical Framing. Rational choice theory requires that preferences be-
tween possibilities do not shift when the framing of the experiment is altered.
Therefore, theory would predict the same outcome in the medical framing as in
the neutral framing discussed previously for condition BN. However, Charness
(2010) states that participants are of great risk to the framing of experiments
as they bring personal attitudes and beliefs to the laboratory, which they ap-
ply to situations they are unfamiliar with. Eckel and Gintis (2010) continue
to state that other regarding preferences are driven by social norms, and social
norms are environment specific. Expected utility theory states that participants
should not exhibit preference reversal in the medical framing, but when taking
into consideration these statements regarding social norms and prior experi-
ences, we could expect that participants would behave more honestly in the
medical framing as they can relate more to such a situation compared to the
neutral framing in our condition BN.
PR3 (L: Liability - Medical Framing and/or Neutral Framing): In
condition L, undertreatment is impossible as the expert seller is liable for the
treatment he provides and overtreatment is dominated by overcharging. There-
fore, an expert always provides the appropriate treatment and charges the price
for the higher one under each price combination. Expecting such a behaviour,
the consumer only interacts in the market if ph ≤ 8. With ph = 8 and expected
cost for providing the appropriate treatment equal to 4 (= (1−h)·cl+h·ch), the
expected profit for the expert is 4, which is larger than the outside option of 1.6.
Therefore, an expert always charges ph = 8 while the price for the lower treat-
ment is not determined (because it is never chosen by the expert since pl < ph).
In other words, one would expect the market to generate high efficiency and
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maximum trade.
PR4 (V: Verifiability - Medical Framing and/or Neutral Fram-
ing): Due to the fact that a customer is able to verify ex-post the quality of
the treatment she receives, an expert always charges the price of the treatment
he provides (i.e. if he provides the low treatment he charges the price of the low
treatment and conversely for the high treatment). Therefore, an expert provides
the appropriate treatment under equal mark-up prices, which are defined such
that ph−pl = ch−cl = 4. In condition V, the inefficiency concern of overcharg-
ing is therefore prevented but it does not necessarily eliminate undertreatment
or overtreatment. Nonetheless, we would expect the market to generate high
efficiency and maximum trade as the expert seller posts equal mark-up prices
and always provides the appropriate treatment.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive Summary Statistics
3.4.1.1 The Effect of Medical Framing on Baseline
Tables 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 present the descriptive results of all experimental treat-
ments conducted in neutral and medical framing.
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Table 3.4.1: Overview of Results - Neutral Framing
Averages per Period Baseline Liability Verifiability
Tradea 0.48 0.67 0.46
Efficiencyb 0.05 0.66 0.10
Undertreatmenta,c 0.67 — 0.43
Overtreatmenta,d 0.11 0.06 0.19
Overcharginga,e 0.83 0.72 —
pl with trade 4.33 4.37 5.59
pl without trade 4.90 5.75 6.32
ph with trade 7.06 7.53 8.14
ph without trade 8.16 9.26 8.94
Actually charged price 6.92 7.22 7.10
Profit sellersf 2.82 2.69 2.45
Profit consumersf 0.52 2.39 1.03
Most prominent price vector
(6,8) 17.6% (6,8) 14.5% (7,8) 10.6%
(5,8) 15.6% (5,8) 11.7% (6,8) 9.8%
(4,8) 6.6% (4,7) 6.3% (6,6) 7.8%
Number of obs. (# subjects) 512 (32) 512 (32) 512 (32)
a relative frequency.
b calculated as (actual average profit - outside option) / (maximum possible average profit -
outside option)
c consumer needs th, but seller provides tl.
d consumer needs tl, but seller provides th.
e seller provides tl, but charges ph (with pl ≤ ph and consumer requiring tl).
f in experimental currency units, in medical framing sellers = doctors and consumers =
patients.
Table 3.4.2: Overview of Results - Medical Framing
Averages per Period Baseline Liability Verifiability
Trade 0.61 0.65 0.54
Efficiency 0.40 0.64 0.21
Undertreatment 0.30 — 0.47
Overtreatment 0.01 0.03 0.25
Overcharging 0.72 0.64 —
pl with trade 4.62 4.50 5.54
pl without trade 5.17 5.11 6.10
ph with trade 7.83 7.85 8.21
ph without trade 8.67 9.13 9.05
Actually charged price 7.43 7.31 6.76
Profit doctor 3.09 2.60 2.55
Profit patient 1.20 2.31 1.25
Most prominent price vector
(6,8) 18.0% (6,8) 20.0% (6,8)15.6%
(4,8) 14.6% (4,8) 20.0% (7,8) 11.7%
(5,8) 11.5% (5,8) 11.5% (5,9) 9.6%
Number of obs. (# subjects) 768 (48) 768 (48) 768 (48)
Note: See previous table’s footnotes for a definition of the variables.
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Economic theory would have predicted that in a market without liability
and/or verifiability we would observe a market breakdown. However, this is not
what we see. In fact we observe that, in Neutral Framing, there is a relative
frequency of trade of 48% and in Medical Framing trade is even higher with
61%. Furthermore, the relative frequency of undertreatment of 67% indicates
that in markets without a liability restriction, undertreatment is a considerable
dilemma but not as pronounced as predicted by PR1. Considering all results
we can therefore reject PR1 since we do not observe a market breakdown or
undertreatment to occur each time trade takes place. Nonetheless, a substantial
number of times participants in the role of experts play according to standard
economic theory by charging the high price ph and delivering the low quality
tl. Additionally, the relative frequency of overcharging in condition BN is only
partially in line with PR1. Subjects in the role of experts provided the low
treatment and charged for the higher one in 83% of times, but not on every
occasion as predicted by PR1.
Furthermore, PR2 is rejected as well, since significant differences in the
means between Neutral framing & Medical framing are observed when a Wilcoxon
Rank-Sum Test is used to analyse the results as depicted in Table 3.4.3. For
instance, all variables but one, pl with trade, are significantly different from the
neutral framing at either the 1% or 5% level of significance. Precisely, exper-
imental participants in condition BM exhibit a more pro-social behaviour in
the direction of being more honest. They undertreat, overtreat and overcharge
significantly less (p < 0.01) compared to participants in condition BN. These
significant differences are depicted in Figure 3.4.1 (a) for Trade, in Figure 3.4.3
(a) for Undertreatment, in Figure 3.4.4 (a) for Overtreatment and in Figure
3.4.6 (a) for Overcharging. Furthermore, participants allocated the roles of sell-
ers (p < 0.05) and consumers (p < 0.01) in condition BM earn significantly
more on average than participants in the equivalent roles in condition BN. The
stronger pro-social behaviour of participants in the medical framing is further
strengthened by their choice of price vectors. In the medical framing the equal
mark-up price (4,8), is 8% more often selected than in the neutral framing.
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Furthermore, when the equal mark-up price was chosen, in the medical framing
environment, participants behaved honestly (i.e. no undertreatment) in more
than 56% compared to only 11% in the neutral framing. However, in both con-
ditions BN and BM, the participants allocated the role of consumers should
not have entered the credence goods market as they earned (BN = 0.52 and
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Figure 3.4.2: Frequency of Trade Neutral vs Medical
Table 3.4.3: Overview Ranksum Test Results - Medical vs Neutral Framing
Medical - Neutral Framing, Mean Diff. (|z − valueg|)
Averages per Period Baseline Liability Verifiability
Tradea 0.13 (4.32)*** -0.02 (0.96) 0.08 (2.65)***
Efficiencyb 0.34 (16.88)*** -0.02 (2.49)** 0.11 (6.38)***
Undertreatmenta,c -0.37 (9.39)*** — 0.04 (1.00)
Overtreatmenta,d -0.10 (5.43)*** -0.03 (1.63) 0.06 (1.70)*
Overcharginga,e -0.11 (3.98)*** -0.08 (2.04)** —
pl with trade 0.29 (1.58) 0.13 (0.59) -0.05 (1.19)
pl without trade 0.27 (2.24)** -0.64 (3.28)*** -0.22 (1.98)**
ph with trade 0.77 (7.90)*** 0.32 (4.09)*** 0.07 (0.18)
ph without trade 0.51 (5.01)*** -0.13 (1.85)* 0.11 (0.32)
Actually charged price 0.51 (4.76)*** 0.09 (1.90)* -0.34 (2.49)**
Profit sellersf 0.27 (2.35)** -0.09 (1.68)* 0.10 (1.73)*
Profit consumersf 0.68 (12.35)*** -0.08 (3.86)*** 0.22 (4.08)***
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
a relative frequency.
b calculated as (actual average profit - outside option) / (maximum possible average profit
- outside option)
c consumer needs th, but seller provides tl.
d consumer needs tl, but seller provides th.
e seller provides tl, but charges ph (with pl ≤ ph and consumer requiring tl).
f in experimental currency units, in medical framing sellers = doctors and consumers =
patients.


















































Figure 3.4.3: Average Rate of Undertreatment Neutral vs Medical
3.4.1.2 The Effect of Medical Framing on Liability
As participants in the liability condition always receive a sufficient treatment,
economic theory predicts that they should always participate in the market. In
particular, in condition L undertreatment is impossible, hence, we should ob-
serve high efficiency and maximum trade to occur as described in PR3. In line


















































Figure 3.4.4: Average Rate of Overtreatment Neutral vs Medical
framing compared to the baseline treatment, however, we do not observe maxi-
mum trade as predicted in PR3. Moreover, we also see a considerable increase
in efficiency as expected compared to the baseline condition. On the other hand,
the relative frequency of overcharging in both neutral and medical framing of
72% and 64% respectively is below the predicted 100% in PR3. In fact it even


























Figure 3.4.5: Average Rate of Overtreatment Neutral vs Medical
results, we observe that participants in the liability treatment move towards a
behaviour that is more consistent with the predictions in PR3.
As previously mentioned in PR2 rational choice theory requires that partic-
ipants in a laboratory experiment do not shift their preferences when a different
framing to the same experiment is applied. When we compare the neutral with
the medical framing in the liability condition, we do not observe such a strong
effect of medical framing on the behaviour of the participants as in the base-
line condition. Nonetheless, we still observe significant differences between the
neutral and medical framing for variables such as overcharging, efficiency and
consumer’s profit which is in contradiction to PR2 (see Table 3.4.3 for a com-
plete overview). On the other hand, in line with PR2, for variables such as trade
and overtreatment we do not find any significant differences. This can be seen
in Figure 3.4.1 (b) and 3.4.4 (b) for trade and overtreatment respectively, or the
insignificant Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test statistic for trade and overtreatment in
Table 3.4.3 (middle column). Additionally, in contrast to the baseline condition,
the introduction of the liability restriction achieved a substantial improvement
in regards to the payoff for consumers. Not only do the sellers (2.69, 2.60) earn


















































Figure 3.4.6: Average Rate of Overcharging Neutral vs Medical
consumers (2.39, 2.31) earn more in both framings. One noticeable result with
the introduction of medical framing in liability, is the fact that participants in
the role of sellers chose the equal mark-up price (4,8) in 20% of periods. This
is an increase of almost 16%5 compared to the liability condition with neutral
framing.
5The price vector (4,8) in liability with neutral framing is chosen in 4.30% of observations
(not shown in the table).
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3.4.1.3 The Effect of Medical Framing on Verifiability
Including the verifiability restriction in a credence goods market will solve the
problem of overcharging but it does not prevent the market inefficiencies of
undertreatment and overtreatment. In particular, overcharging is not possible
because the consumer can observe and verify ex-post the quality provided by
the expert. Hence, the expert seller is unable to charge for the high treatment
ch if he has provided the low treatment cl. Standard economic theory predicts
a market that generates maximal trade volume and full efficiency. Contrary
to PR4 in neutral and medical framing we do not observe maximum trade or
high efficiency to occur. Moreover, the participation rate in the market where
verifiability is introduced is even lower compared to our baseline condition with
no institutional restrictions at all (see Table 3.4.1 for neutral framing and Table
3.4.2 for medical framing respectively).6 The equal mark-up vectors predicted
in PR4 only happen to occur in around 5% of cases. Similar to the liability
condition we do not find a very strong effect, with some exceptions, in verifia-
bility when we alter the context from an abstract to a medical framing. We do
find, however, a significant increase at the 1% level of trade and efficiency in
medical framing as depicted in Table 3.4.3. In addition, consumers in medical
framing earn significantly more (p < 0.01) than consumers in neutral framing.
Nonetheless, consumers in both environments of the experiment should not have
participated in the market as the average earnings are below the outside option
of 1.6. Hence, it seems that in a credence goods experiment, contrary to the
theoretical predictions by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006), verifiability has at
most a minor effect on the behaviour of participants, which is line with a pre-
vious study by Dulleck et al. (2011) who also find a similar result.
To obtain a clearer picture of how the behaviour of the participants evolved
over the duration of the experiment, the findings of the different environments
over time are graphically illustrated. Examining first the relative frequency of
6For a comparison between the baseline and the verifiability condition see Table A.2.1 in
Appendix A.2.
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trade, we can depict that in baseline (Figure 3.4.1 (a)) and verifiability (Figure
3.4.2), compared to liability (Figure 3.4.1 (b)), the participation rate in the
market decreases over time. One reason for such a steady decline in the fre-
quency of trade is the fact that participants in the role of consumers learn that
undertreatment occurs and that it is costly for them. Furthermore, as depicted
in Figure 3.4.1 (a) medical framing has a positive effect on the overall partic-
ipation rate of subjects’ propensity to interact in the market. In conjunction
with the observable decrease in trade in the neutral framing environment, we
also see in Figure 3.4.3 (a) a steady increase in undertreatment over time. In
particular, in the baseline neutral framing environment we observe an increas-
ing trend from 30% to 80% in the propensity to undertreat over time, while
in medical framing undertreatment fluctuates around 30%. This is confirming
the significant (p < 0.01) Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test result in Table 3.4.3 for
the difference between neutral and medical framing for undertreatment in the
baseline condition. The behaviour over time for the baseline neutral case is also
indicating that participants in the experiment move closer towards an outcome
predicted by economic theory, in particular, less participation in the market and
more undertreatment. When we examine Figure 3.4.6 (a) it can be seen that the
frequency to overcharge in the baseline condition starts in period one at around
70% for both framings. However, in the following periods, the behaviour of the
two participant groups differs. While in neutral framing the frequency of over-
charging is increasing to almost 90% over the 16 periods, for medical framing
it increases to almost 90% after 13 periods but then drops again to 70%. We
also observe a significant difference (p < 0.01) between the two environments
when we test for it with a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test (see Table 3.4.3). Exam-
ining Figure 3.4.6 (b) we observe that participants’ tendency to overcharge in
the liability condition, occurs in around 40% of cases in period one for both
framings, after which, it increases with some fluctuations to almost 100% in the
last period. This is perfectly in line with economic theory that expert sellers
always overcharge in the liability condition. The frequency of overtreatment
presents a mixed result. While we observe a significant difference in the means
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for the neutral and medical framing in the baseline condition presented in Table
3.4.3, we can also depict in Figure 3.4.4 that this result is driven by the first
few rounds of the experiments, after which the participants in the two different
environments behave alike. For liability we cannot really observe a different be-
haviour of the participants between the two framings, which is supported by the
insignificant Rank-Sum test result in Table 3.4.3. The behaviour of participants
in medical framing is usually more pro-social except for verifiability, in which
we find a positive, weakly significant difference in the tendency to overtreat,
meaning that participants in medical framing overtreat more, compared to par-
ticipants in neutral framing.7
3.4.2 Estimating the Effect of Medical Framing on Trade,
Undertreatment, Overtreatment and Overcharging
As our dependent variables - trade, undertreatment, overtreatment and over-
charging - are binary, we utilise a probit model for our multivariate analysis.
The outcome variable is determined by whether the observation came from a
session with medical framing (=1) or neutral framing (=0). Additionally, we
include a variable each for the asking price of the low and high treatment respec-
tively. To account for the learning effect during the experiment we divided the
period variable into three different segments with Period 9-16 as our reference
group. We also calculated the marginal effects to interpret the magnitude of
the effects.
Table 3.4.4 presents the results from a probit estimation where we anal-
yse the effect of medical framing, the price of the respective treatment and
the learning effect over the 16 periods on the relative frequency of trade for
our baseline, liability as well as verifiability restrictions. Examining our main
variable of interest, medical framing, we see that it has a very strong positive
7To observe the same analysis for undertreatment, overtreatment and overcharging with
individual participant averages, please refer to Appendix A.1. The results for the baseline
condition are still highly significant, while for liability or verifiability the mean differences are
insignificant.
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influence on the frequency of trade. Participants in medical framing are 23.8
percentage points more likely to participate in the market, contrary to liability
or verifiability where medical framing has no significant effect at all. Moreover,
we observe that the asking price for the low treatment has a significant effect
(p < 0.01) on the relative frequency of trade in liability and verifiability but is
insignificant in our baseline condition. The price for the high treatment has an
even stronger effect on the frequency to interact in the market. For all condi-
tions baseline, liability and verifiability, the asking price for the high treatment
is significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect is also quite strong. For
instance, when we inspect the baseline specification, for every lab$ increase in
the high price, participants are 18.6 percentage points less likely to interact in
the market. Lastly, when we examine how the propensity to interact changes
over time, we observe that for the baseline and verifiability condition there is
a significant positive difference (p < 0.01) in the first eight periods (Period 1-3
and Period 4-8) to participate in the market, compared to our reference group
Period 9-16. For liability, we observe a reverse pattern. In Periods 1-3 there is
lower participation rate than for the later periods, indicating that participants
realise that they always obtain a sufficient treatment since experts are not able
to undertreat a consumer.
Moving on to Table 3.4.5 we examine the impact of our independent vari-
ables, Medical Framing, Price Low, Price High and the different period ranges
Period 1-3, Period 4-8 and Period 9-16, our reference group, on the relative
frequency of undertreatment. Our main variable of interest, medical framing,
is highly significant (p < 0.01) in altering participants propensity to undertreat
in the baseline treatment. In medical framing, undertreatment is 44.5 percent-
age points less likely to occur compared to our reference group neutral framing.
This is in clear contrast to our verifiability condition, where we cannot find any
significant effect of medical framing on the likelihood to undertreat. Besides,
the behaviour of participants in the verifiability condition does not change over
the 16 periods. There is no significant effect between the early periods, Periods
1-3 and Periods 4-8, and our reference group Period 9-16.
3.4 Results 41
We next focus our analysis on the impact of medical framing and the other
independent variables on the relative frequency of overtreatment (see Table
3.4.6). For medical framing we see a similar result as for undertreatment. Only
in the baseline treatment do we detect a significant impact (p < 0.01) of medical
framing on participants’ tendency to overtreat. Specifically, in medical fram-
ing, overtreatment is 6.6 percentage points less likely to occur compared to the
reference group neutral framing. Additionally, in baseline and liability, one can
also see that the likelihood of overtreatment is significantly higher in earlier
periods than in the reference group Period 9-16. For verifiability we do not find
any significant effect for medical framing or a changing behaviour of subjects in
later periods of the experiment.
In the last part of this section we focus our investigation on Table 3.4.7
where we present probit regression results for the effect of medical framing on
overcharging in our baseline and liability conditions. The negative coefficient
for medical framing is highly significant at the 1% level in both conditions. For
instance, in our baseline condition, overcharging is 14.7 percentage points less
likely to occur in the medical environment compared to the neutral environment.
A comparable effect of medical framing on the relative frequency of overcharging
is observed in liability, where participants are 15.8 percentage points less likely
to provide the low treatment and charge for the expensive one. Furthermore,
examining the effect of Price low and Price high on the tendency to overcharge,
one can see that in baseline the price of the low treatment has a significant neg-
ative influence on the overcharging behaviour of experts, while the price for the
expensive treatment has a significant positive effect. This means that expert
sellers in the experiments are 6.7 percentage points more likely to overcharge
for every lab$ increase in the high price. A similar result can be observed for
the liability restriction, such that only the quantitative effects differ slightly but
not the level of significance. Lastly, investigating the propensity of overcharging
uncovers that participants in the baseline condition behave significantly differ-
ently in the first three periods compared to later periods. A different picture
is presented when we examine liability. The propensity to overcharge is signif-
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icantly lower in Periods 1-3 and Periods 4-8 compared to our reference group
9-16.
Table 3.4.4: Probit Regression - Trade
Trade Trade Trade Trade
Variables Baseline Liability Verifiability Overall
Medical 0.609*** -0.063 0.205 0.259***
(4.24) (-0.45) (1.47) (3.20)
0.238 -0.022 0.082 0.101
Price Low -0.043 -0.113*** -0.156*** -0.102***
(-1.39) (-3.74) (-4.90) (-5.88)
-0.017 -0.039 -0.062 -0.040
Price High -0.473*** -0.643*** -0.372*** -0.433***
(-11.69) (-9.41) (-7.36) (-14.76)
-0.186 -0.223 -0.148 -0.169
Period 1-3 0.585*** -0.635*** 0.596*** 0.252***
(5.95) (-5.29) (5.43) (3.54)
0.217 -0.236 0.230 0.096
Period 4-8 0.480*** -0.031 0.452*** 0.325***
(6.27) (-0.31) (4.68) (6.25)







Constant 3.507*** 6.523*** 3.737*** 3.789***
(10.74) (10.15) (6.93) (14.32)
χ2 198.095*** 165.605*** 94.723*** 327.197***
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(Pseudo) R2 0.146 0.257 0.126 0.153
N (Clusters) 80 80 80 240
N (Obs.) 1280 1280 1280 3840
Notes: Clustered standard errors, z-statistics in parentheses and marginal effects in
italics. The reference groups consist of NEUTRAL, PERIOD 9-16 and BASELINE.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.4.5: Probit Regression - Undertreatment
Undertreatment Undertreatment Undertreatment
Variables Baseline Verifiability Overall
Medical -1.183*** 0.309 -0.351**
(-6.24) (1.45) (-2.51)
-0.445 0.120 -0.139
Price Low -0.441*** 0.433*** 0.011
(-7.13) (6.32) (0.26)
-0.174 0.170 0.004
Price High 0.149*** -0.487*** -0.196***
(2.60) (-6.84) (-4.36)
0.059 -0.191 -0.078
Period 1-3 -0.574*** 0.125 -0.213**
(-3.58) (0.88) (-2.11)
-0.213 0.050 -0.083






Constant 1.750*** 1.251** 1.687***
(4.22) (2.27) (5.56)
χ2 117.732*** 61.385*** 60.697***
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
(Pseudo) R2 0.257 0.211 0.056
N (Clusters) 80 80 160
N (Obs.) 666 648 1314
Notes: Clustered standard errors, z-statistics in parentheses and marginal effects in
italics. The reference groups consist of NEUTRAL, PERIOD 9-16 and BASELINE. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.4.6: Probit Regression - Overtreatment
Overtreatment Overtreatment Overtreatment Overtreatment
Variables Baseline Liability Verifiability Overall
Medical -1.101*** -0.266 0.252 -0.191
(-3.64) (-1.20) (1.45) (-1.62)
-0.066 -0.015 0.063 -0.026
Price Low 0.178** -0.117 -0.407*** -0.192***
(2.37) (-1.63) (-6.14) (-5.37)
0.007 -0.006 -0.105 -0.026
Price High -0.063 -0.066 0.388*** 0.129***
(-0.74) (-0.73) (6.51) (2.86)
-0.003 -0.004 0.100 0.017
Period 1-3 1.091*** 1.287*** 0.166 0.785***
(4.35) (5.93) (0.96) (6.87)
0.095 0.161 0.045 0.146
Period 4-8 0.494** 0.370* 0.187 0.299***
(2.23) (1.75) (1.37) (3.22)







Constant -2.171*** -1.094 -2.147*** -2.034***
(-4.32) (-1.62) (-3.81) (-5.61)
χ2 60.297*** 116.805*** 76.923*** 193.817***
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(Pseudo) R2 0.259 0.190 0.227 0.192
N (Clusters) 80 80 80 240
N (Obs.) 614 624 632 1870
Notes: Clustered standard errors, z-statistics in parentheses and marginal effects in italics. The
reference groups consist of NEUTRAL, PERIOD 9-16 and BASELINE. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.4.7: Probit Regression - Overcharging
Overcharging Overcharging Overcharging
Variables Baseline Liability Overall
Medical -0.717*** -0.479*** -0.582***
(-3.91) (-2.61) (-4.45)
-0.147 -0.158 -0.157
Price Low -0.696*** -0.295*** -0.473***
(-8.48) (-5.37) (-9.04)
-0.148 -0.100 -0.132
Price High 0.327*** 0.147*** 0.251***
(4.14) (2.82) (5.10)
0.069 0.050 0.070
Period 1-3 -0.450** -1.193*** -0.789***
(-2.38) (-6.86) (-6.46)
-0.112 -0.444 -0.262






Constant 2.167*** 1.349*** 1.629***
(4.09) (4.22) (5.15)
χ2 82.025*** 105.089*** 160.635***
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
(Pseudo) R2 0.301 0.174 0.222
N (Clusters) 80 80 160
N (Obs.) 882 596 1478
Notes: Clustered standard errors, z-statistics in parentheses and marginal
effects in italics. The reference groups consist of NEUTRAL, PERIOD 9-
16 and BASELINE. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, this study has examined how medical framing influences the
behaviour of participants in a credence goods laboratory experiment on market
specific variables such as trade, undertreatment, overtreatment and overcharg-
ing. The most striking result of the implementation of medical framing is that
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it significantly increases participants pro-social behaviour in our baseline condi-
tion. Specifically, undertreatment is almost 45% less likely to occur in medical
framing compared to the neutral framing environment. However, when an in-
stitutional restriction is included, such as liability, which in itself is already a
strong restriction of the players action space, i.e. no undertreatment possible,
no strong differences are found between neutral and medical framing. In some
cases, even a negative effect of medical framing on the behaviour of the partic-
ipants is found. The same is true for verifiability, where the effect of medical
framing is less prevalent or not significant at all. Why medical framing has no
effect on verifiability is at this point unclear. For undertreatment, the differ-
ence between medical framing and neutral framing in the verifiability condition
is insignificant, which is in strong contrast to the almost 45 percentage point
decrease in the propensity to undertreat in the baseline condition. Hence, to
obtain a clearer result, more experiments with naturalistic framings need to be
undertaken in a credence goods setting.







Supplier-induced demand (SID) is seen as a major issue in the provision of
health services and has been well documented in the empirical literature (Fuchs,
1978; Gruber and Owings, 1996; Gruber et al., 1999; Ju¨rges, 2007). All these
studies rely on field data, with its limitation with respect to allowing a full
identification of causal effects. The theory best suited to model the role of
incentives in this case - Credence Goods theory (Darby and Karni (1973) or
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006, for a comprehensive survey)) - has been tested
in experiments (Kerschbamer et al., 2009; Dulleck et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2014)
and by and large can confirm the empirical literature on SID. Kerschbamer
et al. (2015) also raises the point that participants in these experiments are
consistently driven by different motivations; some simply maximise own payoffs,
others are driven by efficiency concerns or inequality aversion. In this article
we use a credence goods experiment with medical professionals as participants
to address one important question; do medical professionals behave better or
worse compared to standard experimental participants, i.e does the selection
into the health profession increase or mitigate the credence goods problems.
In health economics, SID refers to ‘services ordered by a physician for a pa-
tient, that the patient would refuse if he or she had the same medical knowledge
and expertise as the physician’ (Hay and Leahy, 1982). SID is one of the rea-
sons stated that total expenditure on health in total, but also as a percentage
of gross domestic product, has increased for most countries around the globe.
For example, between 1995 and 2012 for countries such as Germany, Austria,
Australia or the US between 12% and 32% respectively.1 Arrow (1963) argues
that SID in healthcare markets results from the information asymmetry between
a doctor and a patient. Bickerdyke et al. (2002) suggest two different reasons
for the occurrence of SID, namely physicians’ self-interest and the well-being
of their patients. Furthermore, a study cited by Emons (1997) points to the
fact that an average person has a one third higher likelihood of receiving one
1http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.75, accessed 22.03.2015.
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of seven major surgical interventions, compared to a doctor or a member of
a doctor’s family. Such evidence suggests that better informed and educated
patients are less likely to be offered or to accept unnecessary and expensive sur-
gical interventions. Fuchs (1978) shows that there is substantial evidence for the
hypothesis that surgeons shift the demand for operations. In particular, if the
surgeon population ratio increases, the demand for operations increases as well.
Moreover, Ju¨rges (2007) discovers indirect support for the hypothesis that pri-
vate health insurance patients in Germany are convinced to more treatments by
their physicians compared to statutorily insured patients, due to the higher fees
chargeable for the former ones. Further evidence is provided by Gruber et al.
(1999) who show that fee differences of health insurance programs between cae-
sarean deliveries and normal child births, such that caesarean deliveries are more
profitable in one health program, have an influence on the relative frequency of
caesarean deliveries. Gruber and Owings (1996) also report that the frequency
of caesarean section deliveries is negatively correlated with higher birth rates.
Hughes and Yule (1992) find that the number of cervical cytology treatments
is positively correlated with the fee for this treatment. Furthermore, the fear
of doctors being held liable for malpractice could also increase the tendency of
physicians to overtreat (Kessler and McClellan, 1996).2
In information economics, markets of asymmetric information between an
expert and a consumer, such as a doctor and a patient, have been classified
as credence goods markets (Darby and Karni, 1973). The term credence good
describes a situation in which an expert knows more about the quality of a good
a consumer needs than the consumer herself (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2009).3
Darby and Karni (1973) added this type of good to Nelson’s (1970) classification
of ordinary, search and experience goods.
In a medical consultation, the patient knows that something is wrong but
she cannot determine the exact gravity of her illness. Even though the physician
2While costly from a social perspective overprescribing healthcare services does not nec-
essarily have to be a disadvantage for the patient: Folland et al. (2013) states that ‘inducing
more care does no harm if it encourages a move toward the patient optimum’ (p. 306).
3For a survey of the credence goods literature see Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006).
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will make a diagnosis and suggest a treatment, the patient cannot verify if the
prescribed treatment is the appropriate one given the diagnosis. Such informa-
tion asymmetries between a doctor and a patient can lead to inefficiencies such
as undertreatment, overtreatment and overcharging. Furthermore, a key feature
of credence goods is that a patient, even ex-post, cannot verify with certainty
if she received the appropriate service. Hence, the impossibility of verifying the
exact nature of the patients problem gives dishonest doctors the opportunity to
mistreat.
Despite such influence of doctors, not many studies exist that have investi-
gated physicians’ incentives to provide the appropriate treatment in a laboratory
environment. The utilisation of laboratory experiments in health economics has
only recently emerged, most of which have analysed payment systems and how
they affect the incentives of the participants in the experiments by employing
non-medical and medical students. (e.g. Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Kairies
and Krieger, 2013; Brosig-Koch et al., 2013; Green, 2014; Hennig-Schmidt and
Wiesen, 2014; Keser et al., 2014). One exception is Brosig-Koch et al. (2014)
who not only use students but also real physicians in an artefactual field ex-
periment to analyse the behaviour of physicians between a fee-for-service and
capitation system.4 They find that the likelihood of physicians to overtreat is
more widespread in the fee-for-service system. Another related paper is Kester-
nich et al. (2014) who use 132 medical students to study the effect of professional
norms and how they influence the behaviour of prospective medical profession-
als in a laboratory experiment. They find that medical students, when they
have been shown the Hippocratic Oath prior to playing the game, significantly
increase their willingness to forgo some of their own monetary payoff to the
advantage of another participant and also decrease their efficiency concerns in
the experiment. However, the authors also state that professional norms may
decrease the problem of asymmetric information but at the same time they can
lead to more overtreatment. Furthermore, Huck et al. (2014) analysed in an
4“An artefactual field experiment is the same as a conventional lab experiment but with a
nonstandard subject pool”(Harrison and List, 2004, p. 1014).
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experimental setting how a medical insurance and the free choice of a physi-
cian correlates with the overtreatment of patients. They find that competi-
tion mitigates the problem of overtreatment, while having insurance encourages
physicians’ propensity to overtreat patients.
It is often argued that experiments with only a student participant pool lack
external validity. Thus, investigating supplier provision behaviour in an abstract
artefactual field experiment will provide us with important clues in regards to
traits of physician’s activities as suppliers in the health provision. Al-Ubaydli
and List (2013) point out that ‘the best predictor of cheating rates in the nat-
ural field experiment is behavior in sterile laboratory treatments with neutral
language instructions’ (p. 33). Hence, this study investigates the behaviour of
real physicians in an abstract credence goods experiment and compares their
behaviour to a standard participant pool. The results obtained with students
from Chapter 3 are used as a reference point to which we compare our results
for medical professionals. To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first
that attempts to analyse the SID problem using a credence goods experiment
with real physicians. We find that medical professionals undertreat and over-
charge significantly less than students, however, at the same time, physicians
overtreat significantly more than students.5 The more frequent occurrence of
real world experts’ propensity to overtreat has previously been reported by Beck
et al. (2014), by comparing the behaviour of car mechanics and students in a
credence goods laboratory experiment as well as two recently published field
experiments that analyse the credence goods market with real experts such as
taxi drivers and car mechanics respectively (Balafoutas et al., 2013; Schneider,
2012). The remaining paper is structured as follows: the next section discusses
the methodology, followed by the results and concluding remarks.
5To minimise a possible experimenter demand effect in experiments with medical profes-
sionals an external researcher, not familiar with the experiment, was handling most of the





We start by utilising a simplified credence goods model developed by Dulleck
and Kerschbamer (2006). In this game, there are two players: a doctor and
a patient. In the first decision the doctor posts two prices, a price ph for the
high quality service and a price pl for the low quality service, with the condition
(that) ph ≥ pl. The patient gets to know the prices for ph and pl and decides
whether she wants to participate in the market or not6. If not, no trade takes
place and both participants receive the outside option o > 0. If she decides to
interact in the market, nature determines with probability h that the patient
needs the high quality treatment and with probability 1 − h the low quality
one. The doctor learns with certainty which treatment will solve the needs of
the patient and either supplies the high quality treatment th or the low quality
treatment tl, where th incurs costs of ch and tl of cl respectively, with ch ≥ cl.
In the final decision, the doctor charges one of the prices previously specified
for the corresponding treatment. The patient earns a payoff v > 0 if the treat-
ment chosen by the doctor was sufficient (i.e. if she needs the high quality and
obtains the high quality, or she requires the low quality and either receives the
high quality or the low quality) or zero otherwise. The patient, irrespective of
receiving a sufficient or insufficient treatment, has to disburse the cost of the
treatment administered. More formally, let θ ∈ {l, h} be the index of a con-
sumers type of problem, δ ∈ {l, h} be the index for the quality of the treatment
provided and let γ ∈ {l, h} be the index of the quality of treatment actually
charged for. The material payoffs of the seller pid and consumer pip are therefore
as follows:
6We ignore the fact that a patient in a real live situation who is seriously ill cannot just
walk away from visiting a doctor. In such circumstances the outside option should probably
have a negative value as the patient is still not cured from her illness.
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pid(p
l, ph, δ, γ) = pγ − cδ (4.1)
pip(p
l, ph, θ, δ, γ) =
 −pγ if θ = h and δ = l,vθ − pγ otherwise. (4.2)
4.3 Experimental Design
The design of the experiment is the same as previously applied by Dulleck et al.
(2011) and in a recently published paper by Beck et al. (2014). In this paper,
only the baseline condition without institutional restriction, such as liability7
or verifiability8, specified as B/N in Dulleck et al. (2011) is used. The main
differences in this paper are the utilisation of medical professionals, in particular
General Practitioners (GP’s) as participants as well as the implementation of a
strategy method for the players allocated the role of doctors.
4.3.1 Experimental Treatment
Dulleck et al. (2011) and Kerschbamer et al. (2009) found in previous experi-
ments the following parameters calibrated for their analysis; to be able to com-
pare the results of this research with theirs, the same strategy is followed in this
paper. In all treatments we let the patient’s probability of needing the major
treatment be h = 0.5, and the value of sufficient treatment be v = 10. The
costs of providing the minor, respectively major, treatments are cl = 2, and ch
= 6. The prices posted by the doctors, pl and ph are integers from an interval
7In liability, undertreatment is impossible as the expert seller is liable for the treatment he
provides.
8Verifiability prevents the problem of overcharging because consumers can observe and
verify ex-post the quality provided by the seller.
4.3 Experimental Design 54
I ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 11} with pl ≤ ph. The outside option if no trade takes place be-
tween the doctor and the patient is determined at o = 1.6 (see below). A total
of 16 periods is run per session.
To avoid a doctor to building up reputation the matching of participants
is very important. A stranger matching is employed, in which a doctor and a
patient are rematched after each period. Compared to a partner matching, in
which a doctor and a patient interact with each other for the whole 16 periods,
this should considerably reduce the ability to build up reputation. It cannot
completely be dismissed, however, since there is not a perfect stranger matching.
In all sessions conducted with students, matching groups of 8 participants
each are employed, of which four are in the role of sellers, and four in the role of
consumers.9 The assignment to roles is randomly determined at the beginning
of the experiment, and roles are kept fixed throughout the entire experiment.
Participants are informed about the size of the matching groups in each session.
Hence, participants know that the probability of being matched with a specific
trading partner in a specific round is one quarter. However, in all sessions,
participants in the role of experts cannot identify participants in the role of
consumers. A strategy method was applied for the experiment as previously
mentioned. The strategy method allows researchers to obtain a richer dataset
as players in the experiment have to outline their strategy profile for a possi-
ble decision of the opposite player. This has substantial advantages since one
can elicit preferences even at normally unattained decision nodes (Zizzo, 2010).
Specifically, for this experiment it means that for every round an observation
on the decision made of the expert seller was obtained, even for the cases when
the consumer decided not to participate in the market. Figure 4.3.1 illustrates
the sequence of decisions in this game and payoffs provided to each player.10
9For the experiments conducted with medical professionals we did not particularly specify
that, because we did not know how big the room was going to be. The room that was, in the
end, allocated to us, did not allow running of experiments with more than 8 participants at
the time (see Figure B.1.1 for the room setup).
10For an extension of the basic setup where institutional restriction such as liability and
verifiability on the seller’s action space are imposed please see Dulleck et al. (2011) or Beck
et al. (2014).
















































patient enters or not
nature determines the severity of the problem
doctor treats
doctor charges
Figure 4.3.1: Game Tree
4.3.2 Theoretical Predictions
Standard economic theory assumes that both sellers and consumers are ratio-
nal, risk neutral and own-money-maximising agents and that this is common
knowledge. A further assumption is that if consumers are indifferent between
interacting with a seller and not interacting they decide to participate in the
market. Since this is a dynamic game of incomplete information the equilib-
rium concept applied is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main interest of
this study is on symmetric equilibria.11 Moreover, in markets without institu-
tional restrictions (e.g undertreatment is averted because experts are presumed
to be liable) standard economic theory predicts that a doctor would always pro-
vide the low treatment and charge the patient for the high treatment under each
price vector. By knowing this, the patient would always opt out and not partici-
pate in the market if ph > 3. But with such a low ph even sellers who undertreat
11For a theoretical discussion on the solution concept applied please see Dulleck and Ker-
schbamer (2006).
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would earn less than their outside option (ph−cl ≤ 3−2 = 1 < 1.6 = o). Hence,
no price exists for which both parties would obtain at least the same value as
their outside option. Thus, we would expect to observe a market breakdown
as described by Akerlof (1970), since undertreatment is a considerable concern
in a market with asymmetric information. Additionally, overtreatment and
overcharging are going to be an inefficiency concern as well. Hence, the three
main inefficiency concerns in a market for credence goods are undertreatment,
overtreatment and overcharging.
4.3.3 Experimental Procedure
All experimental sessions were run computerised, using CORAL (Schaffner,
2013).12 The laboratory experiments with a standard participant pool (stu-
dents) were conducted at the University of Innsbruck in the winter semester
2012/2013.13 Recruiting for them was organised through ORSEE (Greiner,
2015). A total of 32 participants participated in the experiment.14 All ses-
sions were started with reading out the instruction to the participants. In the
instruction, it was emphasised that all participants receive the same informa-
tion15. The average session length was around 50 minutes. All participants in
the experiment received an initial endowment of 10 points to start with. The ex-
change rate applied in the experiments conducted at the University of Innsbruck
was 4 points equal to 1 euro.
The artefactual field experiment was conducted at a large GP’s conference
(Deutsche Gesellschaft fu¨r Allgemeinmedizin und Familienmedizin (DEGAM
2014)) in Hamburg. The conference organisers provided us with a room, in
12For a detailed introduction of CORAL or to view the homepage that was particularly
created for new users, see Schaffner (2013) or https://github.com/mas802/coral-econ re-
spectively.
13We used the same 32 observation from Chapter 3
14We also conducted the same experiments with students from the Queensland University
of Technology. However, as we were unable to organise experiments with medical professionals
in Australia and due to cultural differences between the participant pools and the medical
professionals (e.g. instructions in different languages), we only report in the main text the
results of experiments conducted in Germany and Austria. See Appendix Table B.3.2 for the
results where we include all the observations.
15See Appendix D.1 for the experimental instructions in English. The experiments with
students and medical professionals were conducted in German.
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which we could set up a mobile lab with eight laptops and one server16 for
the duration of the conference.17 A total of 40 conference participants took
part in the experiment. These sessions were run with eight participants at the
time. The payoff structure was also altered to account for the fact that medical
professionals have a higher opportunity cost of time. We employed a one-to-one
exchange rate, hence, one point equals one euro.18
4.4 Results
Table 4.4.1 provides a descriptive overview of the experimental results for medi-
cal professionals and students. The last column of the table presents the results
of a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test.
Standard economic theory would have predicted that in a market without
institutional restrictions, no trade should take place since sellers would always
provide the lower treatment and charge for the higher one. However, this is not
what was observed. As depicted in Table 4.4.1, there is a relative frequency
of trade of almost 49% in experiments with students and participation in the
market for medical professionals is even higher in the experiment at 60%. The
difference in trade that was observed between the two participant pools is highly
significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, efficiency is also significantly higher
(p < 0.01) for medical professionals compared to students.
16For a picture of the outline and setup of the room please see Figure B.1.1 in the Appendix.
17We received great support by setting up a mobile lab from Olaf Bock and his team of the
Experimental Laboratory at the University of Hamburg.
18We are aware of the fact that an exchange rate of doctors earning 4 times more than
students might not be representing an actual real world situation. The values we implemented
for doctors are actually on the conservative side, however, considering the financial constraint
it was the best we could do. Should there be a bias between the different stake sizes the
results with doctors would probably be downward biased.
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Table 4.4.1: Overview of Baseline Results Medical Professionals vs Students
Neutral Framing
Averages per Period Medical Prof. Students
Mean Diff.
(|z − valueg|)
Tradea 0.60 0.49 0.11 (3.51)***
Efficiencyb 0.23 0.05 0.18 (17.78)***
Undertreatmenta,c 0.50 0.67 -0.17 (3.96)***
Overtreatmenta,d 0.20 0.11 0.09 (3.01)***
Overcharginga,e 0.67 0.83 -0.16 (5.31)***
pl with trade 3.96 4.33 -0.37 (4.12)***
pl without trade 4.35 4.90 -0.55 (3.73)***
ph with trade 7.38 7.06 0.32 (2.84)***
ph without trade 8.50 8.16 0.34 (2.62)***
Actually charged price 6.62 6.92 -0.30 (1.43)
Profit sellersf 2.55 2.82 -0.27 (3.16)***
Profit consumersf 1.39 0.52 0.87 (8.91)***
Most prominent price vector
(4,8) 14% (6,8) 18%
(5,8) 8% (5,8) 16%
(6,8) 7% (4,8) 7%
Number of obs. (# participants) 640 (40) 512 (32)
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
a relative frequency.
b calculated as (actual average profit - outside option) / (maximum possible average profit -
outside option)
c patient needs th, but seller provides tl.
d patient needs tl, but seller provides th.
e doctor provides tl, but charges ph (with pl ≤ ph and consumer requiring tl).
f in experimental currency units.
g Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test where Ho: variablei(Medicalprof == 0) =
variablei(Medicalprof == 1).
By observing the three main inefficiency variables in Table 4.4.1, undertreat-
ment, overcharging and overtreatment, we detect that medical professionals be-
have more honestly. They undertreat and overcharge less often than students
(both p < 0.01). On the other hand, for the main variable of interest in relation
to SID, medical professionals overtreat more often than students (p < 0.01).
However, if medical professionals were only interested in their financial profits,
we should also see that they overcharge more often than students, which was
not observed. One reason for the higher number of overtreatment occurrences
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of medical professionals, compared to students, could indicate a problem in a
physician’s decision heuristics. For instance, medical professionals often cannot
know if a diagnosis is correct or if a treatment can cure a patient for certain if it
is not a straightforward case. It is therefore often an appropriate solution to pre-
scribe additional treatments to obtain a clearer picture of the patients’ medical
situation. Additionally, as depicted in Figure 4.4.1 medical professionals, allo-
cated the role of a doctor, earn less than their student counterparts (p < 0.01).
On the other hand, expert sellers in the experiments conducted with medical
professionals receive a higher average payoff than consumers (p < 0.01) in ex-
periments conducted with non-professionals. Furthermore, the most prominent
price vector chosen by medical professionals is the equal mark-up price19 (4,8)
such that both the doctor and patient would both earn a profit of 2 unless the
doctor cheated. In fact, in almost 60% of times doctors behaved honestly and did
not choose to undertreat while for students almost 90% of times, if they selected
the equal mark-up price, they undertreated the patient. These results combined
clearly indicate that medical professionals allocated the role of sellers, in this
experiment, do not act in their own self-interests per se; rather, they behave in
favour of the consumer. This would be in accordance with a statement made by
Blomqvist (1991) and Kessler and McClellan (1996), who suggested that fear
of litigation or liability could be one reason why physicians may prescribe more
treatments than actually needed, and not to increase their monetary payoff. In
line with this result is an observation by Iizuka (2007) who finds that doctors
in Japan, who often prescribe and distribute drugs to their patients, react to
mark-up differences in the Japanese drug prescription market. In particular, he
finds that physicians in Japan tend to care more about out-of-pocket expenses
for patients than generating a higher profit for themselves from the mark-up.
However, in Figure 4.4.1, it can also be seen that the average payoffs for the con-
sumer in the experiment with medical professionals (1.39) and students (0.52)
are below the outside option of 1.6. In fact, half of the participants allocated the
role of consumers in the experiment with medical professionals, received more
19An equal mark-up price-vector is defined such that ph − pl = ch − cl = 4.
4.4 Results 60
than the outside option of 1.6, while in contrast only two participants playing
with students received a higher average payoff than 1.6. Hence, it would have
been more beneficial to choose the outside option and stay away from the cre-
dence goods market for both participant groups in the respective experiments
allocated the roles of consumers. To test the robustness of the results of this
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Figure 4.4.1: Average Payoff
4.4.1 Estimating the Effect of Trade, Undertreatment,
Overtreatment and Overcharging
Table 4.4.2 presents Probit regression results of medical professionals’ impact on
the relative frequency of trade, undertreatment, overtreatment and overcharg-
ing. The results and the signs of the coefficients of medical professionals are as
expected and in line with the analysis in the previous section. Table 4.4.2’s spec-
ification (1) presents the regression results for the differences in the likelihood
20To observe the same analysis for undertreatment, overtreatment and overcharging with
individual participant averages, please refer to Appendix B.2. The results have only changed
slightly but are still highly significant.
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of trade between medical professionals and students. Medical professionals are
14.7 percentage points more likely to participate in the market than students.
This is also illustrated by Figure 4.4.2 (a), where, over the 16 periods, the rel-
ative frequency of trade of medical professionals is, almost everywhere, higher
than for students. This higher decline in trade for students indicates that par-
ticipants learn about the fact that undertreatment happens and that it is costly
for them (Dulleck et al., 2011). This is also illustrated by the significant positive
coefficients (p < 0.01) of Period 1-3 and Period 4-8 compared to the reference
group Period 9-16. In specification (2), the differences between the two partic-
ipant pools are analysed for undertreatment. A strong and highly significant
difference is found at the 1% level. The marginal effect indicates that medical
professionals are 26 percentage points less likely to undertreat than students.
Furthermore, in Figure 4.4.2 (b) one can depict that for student participants the
average rate of undertreatment, over the 16 periods, is in most of the periods
above or at equal percentage levels. In three out of 16 periods, however, the
frequency of undertreatment was higher for medical professionals. Moreover, it
was also observed that the price for the high treatment is statistically significant
at the 1% level. The marginal effect is indicating that for every lab$ increase in
price, there is a 6 percentage point increase in undertreatment occurrences. The
negative coefficients of the period variables are confirming the illustration pre-
sented in Figure 4.4.2 (b) where it is seen that the frequency of undertreatment
4.4 Results 62
is lower in earlier periods compared to later periods.
Table 4.4.2: Probit Regressions - Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Trade Undertreatment Overtreatment Overcharging
Medical Prof. 0.375** -0.693*** 0.629*** -1.121***
(2.27) (-3.79) (3.41) (-6.08)
0.147 -0.262 0.124 -0.248
Price Low -0.021 -0.388*** 0.196*** -0.570***
(-0.86) (-8.25) (6.06) (-6.09)
-0.008 -0.150 0.041 -0.128
Price High -0.225*** 0.162*** -0.004 0.409***
(-7.17) (3.57) (-0.08) (5.39)
-0.089 0.062 -0.001 0.092
Period 1-3 0.369*** -0.484** 0.853*** -0.503***
(3.83) (-2.55) (5.32) (-2.87)
0.141 -0.190 0.230 -0.134
Period 4-8 0.328*** -0.587*** 0.149 -0.195*
(4.20) (-4.35) (1.07) (-1.65)
0.127 -0.228 0.032 -0.046
Constant 1.603*** 1.385*** -2.521*** 0.910***
(6.27) (4.06) (-6.45) (2.86)
χ2 70.740*** 99.221*** 140.982*** 85.119***
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(Pseudo) R2 0.091 0.200 0.142 0.324
N (Clusters) 72 72 72 72
N (Obs.) 1152 550 602 824
Notes: Clustered standard errors, z-statistics in parentheses and marginal effects in italics. The
reference groups consist of STUDENTS and PERIOD 9-16. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Specification (3) in Table 4.4.2 compares the likelihood of overtreatment occur-
rences between medical professionals and students. The coefficient of overtreat-
ment is positive and highly significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect
indicates that medical professionals overtreat 12.4 percentage points more often
than students. Looking at Figure 4.4.3 (a) no clear difference in trends between
the two groups can be observed over time, except for the fact that in most
periods, medical experts overtreat more than non-medical experts as indicated
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in the significant positive coefficient of medical professionals in specification 3.
Furthermore, overtreatment over time seems to be higher in earlier periods com-
pared to later ones, as indicated in the significant positive coefficient of Period
1-3. Additionally, for every point increase in the lower price, the tendency to
overtreat seems to increase by 4.1 percentage points, while the price for the
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Figure 4.4.3: Average Rate of Overtreatment & Overcharging
The aim of the last column of Table 4.4.2 is to explore the difference between
the two participant pools in their propensity to overcharge. As shown in spec-
ification (4) the coefficient for overcharging is significantly different at the 1%
level between medical professionals and students. Overcharging is 24.8 percent-
age points less likely to occur with medical professionals as experts compared to
student experts. By looking at Figure 4.4.3 (b) over the 16 periods, we can ob-
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serve that medical professionals begin with a very low probability of overcharg-
ing but their tendency to overcharge increases quickly, confirming the result we
obtained for the significant negative coefficient of Period 1-3. Compared to our
reference group Period 9-16 overcharging is 13.4 percentage points less likely to
occur at the beginning of the experiment. Demographic characteristics such as
age and gender were also controlled for, but no significant influence was found
and therefore not included in the main text. Please see Appendix Table B.3.1
for the regression results. As further robustness checks we have also conducted
a random effects panel regression Table B.3.5, a probit random effects panel
regressions Table B.3.3 and the same regression model but with bootstrapped
standard errors Table B.3.4. The results do not show any deviations from the
original results.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper analysed fraud and service provision with a focus on the SID effect
in the health care market by conducting an artefactual field experiment with
medical professionals. In particular, the behaviour of university students from
IBK, was compared with participants at a large medical GP conference in Ham-
burg. It was found that medical professionals in an experimental credence goods
market overtreat significantly more than students but concurrently undertreat
and overcharge significantly less. Hence, the results of this research are similar
to those of Beck et al. (2014) who find that car mechanic professionals overtreat
significantly more than their student counterparts in the experiment. In line
with these results, it is argued that the difference observed is a result of the
decision rule learned by car mechanics in the past. We also believe that the
difference between medical professionals and students could emerge due to the
training and decision heuristics learned by medical professionals through their
experience working as doctors. It could also depend on a physicians risk atti-
tude, for instance, when confronted with a straightforward diagnosis; physicians
fear of a malpractice lawsuit is negligible, however, when experiencing a com-
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plicated incident it is easier for a risk-averse physician to prescribe additional
treatments to prevent future complications. Moreover, as previously mentioned,
the results in this experiment indicate that medical professionals, who are al-
located the role of a doctor, ceteris paribus, care more for the patients in the
experiments, than do the students. They forgo a higher profit for themselves by
choosing three times more often than students the equal mark-up price (4/8).
As overtreatment is a frequent occurrence in a market for credence goods when
professions such as taxi drivers (see Balafoutas et al., 2013), car mechanics (see
Schneider, 2012; Beck et al., 2014) or - as in this paper - medical professionals
are analysed, it seems to be of a greater concern than previous experimental
papers have suggested (see Dulleck et al., 2011; Kerschbamer et al., 2009).
This research suggests that to tackle the problem of SID in the health care
market we need not only to understand the bare numbers of follow up visits and
physicians density but also physicians behaviour. Furthermore, our research
did not analyse the risk attitude of a physician in particular, but for future
research that could be an interesting additional aspect to consider. For example,
more risk-averse physicians prescribe more follow-up visits to account for their
uncertainty. However, due to the low number of physicians participating in
the experiment, it was not possible to run more treatments with institutional
restriction such as liability or verifiability. Also, it would have been interesting
to observe how physicians behaviour might change when a medical framing
was implemented, compared to a neutral framing as in this experiment. In
addition, there may also be a selection effect, due to personality traits such
as the intellectual curiosity of doctors in this experiment (Slonim et al., 2013).
It is not common for doctors to participate in laboratory experiments, as our
post survey indicated. More than 50% of doctors have never participated in
a laboratory experiment previously. Hence, some participants may have just
wanted to find out what the experiment was about and therefore participated,
while others, wanted to help us out to obtain a sufficient number of participants.
While this research only investigated one area of fraud and service provision, it
could also be applied to most situations where asymmetry of information is a
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key characteristic.
In Chapter 3 it has been analysed whether the concept of being a medical
professional affects the behaviour of participants in the experiment (i.e more
honestly). The second study in Chapter 4 analysed whether medical profession-
als behave any different than students in respect to honesty. This raises a ques-
tion about selection into the medical profession. Are individuals self-selecting
into medical professions the same or are they different from other profession-
als? In the following section, Chapter 5 investigates whether the behaviour of
law, accounting and engineering students are any different from the behaviour
of medical students, by extending the previous credence goods experiment with
some additional games.
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The average person spends more than 40 years in the workforce, which is a
substantial amount of a persons lifespan. Hence, it is essential that individuals
allocated themselves in an efficient way to choose the most suitable profession
in respect to their talents and aptitudes and to reduce damage to society as
a whole. People who are better suited for a job have less stress, feel proud
of things they have achieved and feel happier overall than people who are less
suitable for the job (Harter and Arora, 2010). Moreover, society benefits from
people who are happier or better suited to jobs since their productivity is higher.
Hence, self-selecting into a career for which one is not well-matched is not only
inefficient for society, but it can also cost society a vast amount of resources.
For example, a poor general practitioner (GP) who fails to accurately diagnose
a serious illness has the potential to undertreat a patient and in the long run the
cost for the treatment is much higher for the patient than it should have been.
Furthermore, a GP lacking the appropriate skills, who cannot determine the
illness of a patient, possibly prescribes many more treatments than necessary.
Therefore, we need people to make better, more informed decisions not only for
themselves, but also for society.
Smith (1776) argues that specialisation is one possible solution for society
to overcome such problems; the division of labour plays an important part for
a society to develop and flourish. For example, in the medical sector, a surgeon
who specialises in organ transplant is much better at performing the procedure
than a surgeon who only does it sporadically. Specialisation ensures a greater
investment in knowledge that is beneficial to society. Becker and Murphy (1994)
state that, ‘the dependence of specialization on the knowledge available ties the
division of labor to economic progress since progress depends on the growth in
human capital and technologies’ (p. 300). University education is one way to
better society where future employees can be educated to obtain the skills needed
for the community. For a society to advance, universities play an essential part
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in industrial innovation through the education of prospective professionals to
teach them new and improved techniques or ideas, which they can then apply
in their professional lives - for example, public health, infrastructure, justice
and the tax system, to name a few. Since individuals are already self-selecting
themselves into university courses and thus careers, choosing the appropriate
area of study is not only for prospective students a major objective, but also
one for society. Companies have to spend a significant amount of money on
training to ensure that the person they are going to hire is the right one (Karsan,
2007), and on creating a meaningful work experience for employees as this will
decrease the number of people leaving for another job (Scroggins, 2008). If this
money is squandered it will evidently harm society’s growth in the long run, as
companies have less money to invest. Hence, investigating if there are certain
desired types of behaviour that are better suited for specific professions is of
fundamental importance. Investigating people who are still in the education
system (not yet active in the profession) is vital to investigate if the matching,
as it currently is, is adequate. Pingle (2010) states that ‘history matters because
it not only determines the heuristics we have available in our tool box, but it
also determines where we are in the evolutionary process of matching heuristics
to contexts’ (p. 75). Hence, since prospective professionals have not yet learned
heuristics that could drive their behaviour in certain situations, investigating
students allows us to obtain a clearer understanding of the behaviour of future
professionals prior to their practical experience.
Medical professions appear to have a high social status within society and
a reputation for honesty and strong ethical beliefs. Society expects from med-
ical professionals an exemplary character. Dishonest and unethical behaviour
of doctors can harm society immensely, for example, by overtreating or over-
charging patients, which costs the public a significant amount of money. But
is this true, do medical professionals behave any better than their peers? From
previous research we know that doctors do not always behave as honestly as the
they should and, for instance, react to fee incentives (Gruber and Owings, 1996;
Gruber et al., 1999; Hughes and Yule, 1992; Ju¨rges, 2007; Fuchs, 1978). This
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paper will analyse if health, law, engineering and accounting students already
possess the traits of professionals as seen by the public in regards to honesty and
ethical behaviour, and in particular, whether future medical professionals live
up to public expectations of honesty and ethical behaviour when compared to
the other prospective professionals. For this paper, it was decided to focus the
analysis on the four aforementioned professions because they are all essential to
a well-functioning society. Being a lawyer is a very important profession that
needs reputable people with an outstanding character. Lawyers are involved in
the development of rules and the protection of the interest of the common mass
using the condition of the constitution. Ben Letham (2010) nicely states that,
‘in a society which is governed by the rule of law, lawyers are a society’s gateway
to the justice their population is entitled to’.1 Unethical or dishonest lawyers
can take advantage of the law and bend it to their advantage, which might not
be in the best interest of society. As an extension, in the legal professions, also
corrupt judges, for example, are a risk to society if they let criminal offenders
walk free. Another profession that needs people with an immaculate character is
accounting. Embezzling money is only one way by which a dishonest accountant
can harm society. Minor mistakes in the book keeping journal due to dishonest
book keeping can have serious consequences and even lead to the collapse of a
company, which is very costly for society. The last professional group in which
we are interested are engineers. Engineers are essential for solving and tackling
the problems of present and future society. Unethical or dishonest engineers can
cause major disasters if they behave in an incorrect way by choosing cheaper
and faulty materials, for example, just to increase their profit for a project. The
general public view is that people of certain jobs are more honest and ethical
than others. While all of these professions require a different skill set, they are,
in certain characteristics, quite similar to each other.
Figure 5.1.1 illustrates graphically over time the percentage of people who
answered the question how certain jobs rate in regards to honesty and ethics
1http://www.goinglegal.com/why-are-lawyers-important-in-our-society-1377884.
html, accessed on 3 August 2015.
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with either high or very high (y-axis). We can depict that Medical Doctors,
Pharmacists and Engineers are rated very similarly, while Accountants receive
a less positive judgement, and Lawyers are rated even lower. Furthermore, to
obtain a feeling how the aforementioned professions compare to other profes-
sions within society, we included a few more occupations in Figure 5.1.2. It
can be seen that Medical Doctors, Pharmacists and Engineers are rated higher
compared to other jobs. Police Officers are close behind; however, jobs such as
Accountants, Lawyers and Bankers are rated lower but considerably higher still
when compared to Car Salespeople and Members of Congress. Occupational
prestige, as viewed by sociologists, confirms the results from the 2014 Gallup
Poll - that medical professionals, in particular Physicians, are looked upon very
positively. On the other hand, while Lawyers’ public perception is relatively low
in regards to honesty and ethics, being a Lawyer is associated with a high occu-
pational prestige within society. Table 5.1.1 presents the occupational prestige
scores for the professions of interest.2
Table 5.1.1: Occupational Prestige Scores3






These four professional groups were chosen, not only for their key roles and
their benefits to a well-functioning society, but also because they have similari-
ties and differences between the groups that allow us to compare their behaviour
with each other. This includes: social status, educational requirements, profes-
sional associations and litigation. We are particularly interested in students
aka future professionals in these disciplines, since they have not yet collected
2http://ibgwww.colorado.edu/~agross/NNSD/prestige%20scores.html, accessed on 1
August 2015.
3http://publicdata.norc.org/GSS/DOCUMENTS/BOOK/GSS_Codebook_AppendixF.pdf, ac-
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any work experience that could bias their behaviour in our experiment. For
example, Beck et al. (2014) believe that the differences they observe in their
experiment between students and car mechanics are due to learned experiences
in the past by professionals confirming Pingle’s (2010) previous statement that
learned heuristics in the past might matter. Several studies exist that have
compared the behaviour of real world experts with students for different envi-
ronments, and find mixed results; Siegel and Harnett (1964); Dyer et al. (1989);
Cooper et al. (1999) find a similar behaviour while Potters and van Winden
(2000); Fehr and List (2004); Alevy et al. (2007); Carpenter and Seki (2011)
find the opposite.
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the different future professional participants in regards to honesty. To the best
of our knowledge this is the first study that combines a credence goods exper-
iment with medical framing, a tax compliance experiment with a public goods
structure and a self-reporting task with an environmental framing in one single
experiment to analyse the behaviour of future professionals. Implementing a
different naturalistic framing in each task, that is relevant to at least one par-
ticular profession, allows us to obtain a better understanding of the behavioural
differences between professions. This is in accordance with Ansink and Bouma
(2013, p.3), who state that “it is not clear whether and how subjects in the lab
relate to, for instance, a ‘business’ or ‘Wall Street’ frame. From this perspec-
tive, framing should be matched to a subject pool to which the frame applied”.
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Specifically, we have a two-player strategic interaction game with type uncer-
tainty and a medical framing relevant for our health subject (see Section 5.2.2),
a within-group public goods game with external enforcement risk framed as a
tax compliance game relevant for the law and accounting participants (see Sec-
tion 5.2.4), as well as an honesty experiment with external enforcement risk and
an environmental framing applicable for the engineering students (see Section
5.2.3). We find that the participant group for which the framing is relevant
behaves more honestly, when compared to a pooled comparison group with the
remaining participants, in that particular task with one exception. Law stu-
dents behave less honestly in the tax compliance framing than the remaining
participants. However, most of the results are not statistically significant. Fur-
thermore, comparing every professional group individually against each other,
we see that accounting students are overall the most honest group, followed by
medical students. The two least honest student groups in our experiment are
engineering and law students. The remaining paper is structured as follows,
the next section discusses the experimental design, followed by the results and
concluding remarks.
5.2 Experimental Design
The experiment is divided into three different tasks. Each task is relevant to
a different professional participant group to observe their behaviour in regards
to honesty in the experiment. Moreover, every task employs a naturalist fram-
ing, matching one of the groups to see if the framing alters the participants’
behaviour. In particular, a credence goods experiment with medical framing is
run (see Chapter 3 of this document) pertinent to possible future health profes-
sionals, a tax compliance game with a public goods structure relevant for law
and accounting students and a self-reporting task similar to Friesen and Gan-
gadharan (2013) but with an environmental framing relevant to engineering
students.4
4See Appendix D.1.7 for the experimental instruction.
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5.2.1 Experimental Treatments
Given that we have three different tasks in one experiment, we have to control
for the order in which we present them to avoid an order effect. Since 3! =
3 × 2 × 1 = 6 we have therefore six possible orders in which we can present
the tasks. Moreover, the matching of participants is different for all tasks.
While we have no interaction between participants for the self-reporting task
with an environmental framing, we have a repeated interaction in groups of
four in the tax compliance task. For the credence goods task we do not use
a matching group of eight subjects each (4 doctors and 4 patients) in which
the subjects are matched after each round within that group as it is normally
done; instead, we have that a doctor and a patient are randomly matched with
a participant in the experiment of the opposite role after each round. Hence,
instead of having a 25% possibility to be matched with the same player of the
opposite role, there is only a 12.5% likelihood for this to happen if we run the
experiment with 16 participants (8 doctors and 8 patients). However, in all
sessions, participants in the roles of doctors cannot identify participants in the
opposite role. Furthermore, in the credence goods task we also apply a strategy
method for the player in the role of the doctor. Using a strategy method allows
us to obtain an observation for the doctor in regards to the price and treatment
chosen in every single round, even in the case when the patient decided not to
interact with the doctor. The strategy method allows us to collect more data
for the person in the role of the doctor, which we otherwise would not have. In
either task, participants are required to make a decision in 10 rounds. Hence,
participants play a total of 30 rounds.
5.2.2 Two-player Strategic Interaction Game with Type
Uncertainty
This task is similar to the credence goods experiment with a medical framing
conducted in Chapter 3. We have two roles, a doctor and a patient. The doctor
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posts prices for the special intravenous drip and the normal intravenous drip.
Then the patient decides if they want to be examined by the doctor or not. If the
patient chooses yes, then the doctor gets to know with certainty the severity of
the disease and administers either the special or normal intravenous drip. If the
patient chooses no, then the round ends and both get paid the outside option.
However, there are a few differences compared to that outlined in Chapter 3;
firstly, we adjusted all the values by a factor of 50 to have a similar payoff
structure with the other two tasks of the experiment and secondly, we only run
a total of 10 periods instead of 16 periods as in the previous chapters.5 For a
more detailed discussion of the credence goods experimental setup, please refer
back to Chapter 3 and/or 4.
5.2.3 Honesty Experiment with External Enforcement Risk
Participants are asked to make a production decision as the owner of a chem-
ical production company. Since this is a risky business there is a chance that
a chemical spill can occur. The production decision chosen by the participants
directly affects the probability of a chemical spill. Participants can reduce the
probability of a chemical spill but it is costly and will therefore reduce their
production earnings. Likewise, increasing the probability of a chemical spill
will increase a participant’s production earnings. Regardless of a chemical spill
occurring or not, a participant receives the production earnings. There is, how-
ever, a 50% chance that a participant might be inspected. If a participant were
to be inspected and a chemical spill has occurred, then a participant has to pay
a fine. The probability of having a chemical spill is determined by the computer
in accordance with a participant’s chosen accident probability and is indepen-
dent across rounds. Furthermore, a participant is asked to fill in a report about
whether an accident has occurred or not. If a participant reports that an acci-
dent has occurred, they always have to pay a self-reporting fine, which is less
5For example, while in the previous experiment we have a cost of the normal or special
intravenous drip of 2 and 6 respectively, for this task we have a cost of 100 and 300 respec-
tively. The same adjustment was applied for the prices the doctor can charge for the different
infusions. i.e I ∈ {50, 100, . . . , 550} instead of I ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 11} as in the previous experiment.
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than the fine a participant has to pay if they reported they did not have an
accident despite having had one and getting inspected.
5.2.4 Within-group Public Goods Game with External
Enforcement Risk
In this task, participants are responsible for making a tax declaration decision.
Each round represents one year and proceeds in three stages. Additionally,
participants are grouped together with four other participants amongst the tax
revenue is redistributed. In the first stage of each round, participants receive
an income of 100 lab$, which represents their taxable income. On the amount
of income a participant declares, a universal tax rate of 30% will be applied. In
the second stage of the experiment, the taxes payable will be deducted from a
participant’s income. The remaining net income accumulates as wealth. Also in
this stage, there is a 10% likelihood that a participant might be selected for an
audit, in which the declared income will be checked against the real income of
that year. If there is a discrepancy between the real and stated income, a fine of
1.5 times the amount of undeclared income will be deducted from a participant’s
income of that year on top of all taxes owed. Finally, in the third and last stage
of one round, every group member will receive a transfer, which is the sum of
tax contributions of all members of the group multiplied 1.6 and divided by
the group size (= 4). For instance, if the amount of taxes (i.e. the sum of tax
payments of all members of the group) is 30 lab$, each group member receives
a transfer payment of 12 lab$ (= 30× 1.6/4).
5.2.5 Experimental Procedure
All experimental sessions were run with CORAL (Schaffner, 2013). Recruiting
was done with ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) in Semester 2 2014 and Semester 1 and
2 2015 at the Queensland University of Technology. A total of 108 students
from four different majors, namely Health (21), Law (23), Accounting (32) and
Engineering (32), participated in the experiment. A total of nine sessions were
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run. In every session, the tasks were presented in a different order to the par-
ticipants, to avoid an order effect. The session size varied between 8, 12 and 16
participants in the experiments. At the beginning of the sessions, the instruc-
tions were read out to the participants. It was highlighted in the instructions
that all participants were to receive the same information. The average session
length was approximately 1 - 1.5 hours. In addition to a 5 dollar show-up fee,
each experimental tasks associated payoff has been adjusted to obtain an ex-
pected payoff of $5 as well. Hence, the expected total payoff for a participant
in the experiment is $20.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Credence Goods Task
In the following section, the results for the different experimental tasks are pre-
sented and discussed separately. Firstly, the credence goods task with a medical
framing is discussed, followed by the self-reporting task with an environmental
framing and lastly, the behaviour of the participant in the public goods game
with external enforcement risk framed as a tax compliance game.
Since we are mainly interested in how the framing of the different tasks
affects the specific student cohort - for instance, for health students, the medical
framing - we compare the student cohort for which the frame is relevant against
the pooled rest of the students in the experiment. Figures 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 present
graphically the means of the different participant pools for our variables of
interest. Table 5.3.1 presents the Wilcoxon rank sum test results between the
different participant pools and our variables of interest. In the appendix, Tables
C.2.1 to C.2.4 present the descriptive statistics of the different variables for the
different groups.
The first four variables, Interact, Undertreatment, Overtreatment and Over-
charging, belong to the credence goods task with medical framing. Illustrated
in Figure 5.3.1(a), it can be seen that prospective health professionals in the
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role of the patient, compared to the rest of the participants, choose more often
to be examined by and therefore interact with a doctor. As depicted in Table
5.3.1, the difference in the propensity to interact between prospective health
professionals and the rest of the participants is significantly different (p < 0.05).
It seems that prospective health professionals trust the player in the opposite
role more than the other participants. This is a desirable result, as medical pro-
fessions require a lot of soft skills and are intense in human relations. Trusting
other people is a sign for a more pro-social behaviour.
Figure 5.3.1(b) depicts the propensity of undertreatment to occur. It can be
seen that health students undertreated less, however, no significant difference
between the groups can be observed.
The probability of overtreatment between the two groups is depicted in Fig-
ure 5.3.2(a). Health students overtreat slightly more than the rest of the partic-
ipants but the difference is not significant. The same applies for the propensity
to overcharge as depicted in Figure 5.3.2(b). Prospective health professionals
overcharge less but the difference is insignificant, as can be seen in Table 5.3.1
when we compare the two means with a Wilcoxon ranksum test.
Figure 5.3.4(a) illustrates the payoffs for health students, acting as doctors
in the credence task, and their respective patient.6 Note that the participants
were not aware of the major of the opposing party, so it is meaningless to look
at responses of the patients by majors, as they are price takers. We can see
that health students in the role of doctors earn, on average, 35 cents less per
round than doctors of the other group, however, the difference is not significant
(Table 5.3.1). On the other hand, a patient interacting with a prospective health
professional earned more than a patient playing against someone from the rest
of the participant group. Even though the patient from a health student earned
around 25 cents more on average, the difference is not significant, as shown in
Table 5.3.1. The striking result is the amount (1.86) that patients from doctors
of health majors receive. Furthermore, patients from doctors of the remaining











































Rest of Participants Health
(b) Undertreatment
Figure 5.3.1: Interact & Undertreatment
participants received almost the exact same value (1.61) as people who chose not
to interact in the market (1.60). Comparing this with the Dulleck et al. (2011)
baseline condition, they did, however, not incorporate a naturalist framing;
participants in the comparable role as the patient never received an amount
anywhere close to the outside option of 1.6. While economic theory would have














































Rest of Participants Health
(b) Overcharging
Figure 5.3.2: Overtreatment & Overcharging
section 5.3 on page 29, this is clearly not the case here. Evidently, the medical
framing has a pro-social effect on the behaviour of players in the role of doctors
when compared to the neutral framing experiment conducted by Dulleck et al.
(2011).
Overall, it can be concluded that, in general, the medical framing in the
credence goods experimental task affects health students more strongly in the
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direction of behaving more honestly than the rest of the participant group,
however, the effect is not strong enough to obtain a significant difference.7
7Since we only have 21 prospective health professionals in the experiment this could be
one reason why we do not have a strong enough effect.
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Table 5.3.1: Overview of Results
Credence Goods Task
Averages per Period Health Rest of Participants
Mean Diff.
(|z − valuef|)
Interacta 0.67 0.58 0.08 (2.14)**
Undertreatmenta,b 0.29 0.34 -0.05 (0.95)
Overtreatmenta,c 0.09 0.08 0.01 (0.47)
Overcharginga,d 0.63 0.70 -0.07 (1.49)
Profit Doctore 2.47 2.82 -0.35 (1.52)
Profit Patiente 1.86 1.61 0.25 (1.04)
# of obs. (# participants) 210 (21) 870 (87)
Environmental Task
Averages per Period Engineers Rest of Participants
Mean Diff.
(|z − valuef|)
Accident Self-Reportinga 0.33 0.31 0.02 (0.53)
Profit 90.27 90.60 0.33 (0.16)
# of obs. (# participants) 320 (32) 760 (76)
Tax Compliance Task
Averages per Period Law / Acc Rest of Participants
Mean Diff.
(|z − valuef|)
Tax Compliance Ratea (Law) 0.65 0.72 -0.07 (1.74)*
Profit 109.83 112.27 -2.44 (1.51)
Tax Compliance Ratea (Accounting) 0.74 0.69 0.05 (2.25)**
Profit 112.71 111.34 1.36 (1.33)
# of obs. (# participants) (Law) (230) 23 (850) 85
# of obs. (# participants) (Acc) (320) 32 (760) 76
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
a relative frequency.
b patient needs th, but seller provides tl.
c patient needs tl, but seller provides th.
d doctor provides tl, but charges ph (with pl ≤ ph and consumer requiring tl).
e in experimental currency units.
f Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test
5.3.2 Environmental Task
In this section, analysis is conducted on how the environmental framing in an
‘Honesty Experiment with External Enforcement Risk’ affects engineering stu-
dents as the main participant group of interest, compared to the pooled rest
of the participants, who self- report an accident and accept a fine more often
than the rest of the pooled participant group. However, the average rate of
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self-reporting an accident is quite low at 33% of times. Nonetheless, this is still
much higher than the 15% observed in a similar task conducted in Friesen and
Gangadharan (2013). Furthermore, no significant difference between the two
participant groups can be detected. In Figure 5.3.3(b), we can also see that
engineers seem to be slightly more risk averse due to the fact that, on aver-
age, they have chosen a lower accident probability than the pooled comparison
group. Both participant groups earned a similar profit (90.27 vs 90.60) on aver-
age per round as can be seen in Figure 5.3.4(b) and the insignificant Wilcoxon
rank sum test in Table 5.3.1.
Relating these results to the environmental framing of this task, we can see
that engineering students behave more honestly i.e more self-reporting than the
comparison group. Also the accident self-reporting percentage in our natural-
istic framing is more than double the number that Friesen and Gangadharan
(2013) obtain in a neutral framing. Moreover, engineering students also choose
a lower accident probability and earn a slightly smaller profit than our pooled
comparison group. This result indicates that the environmental framing, which
is related to the future profession of the participants, has a positive effect on
the decision behaviour of future engineers in regards to honesty. However, the
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(b) Payoff Environmental Task
Figure 5.3.4: Average Payoff Credence & Environmental Task
5.3.3 Tax Compliance Task
In this section, the experimental result is analysed for the Within-group Public
Goods Game with External Enforcement Risk framed as a tax compliance game.
The framing of this task is relevant to two of the invited participant groups,
namely for Law and Accounting students. Hence, we have conducted two com-
parisons. First we compare law students against the pooled rest, which includes
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accounting students, health and engineering students. In the second compari-
son, prospective accounting professionals are compared against the pooled rest,
which consists of prospective law, health and engineering professionals. Illus-
trated in Figure 5.3.5 we can depict the tax compliance rate calculated as
Declared Income
Actual Income . A value close to one indicates a high compliance rate while
a value close to zero indicates a high propensity to tax evade. On the left side
of Figure 5.3.5 we can depict that the tax compliance rate, of law students
in comparison with the pooled rest of the participants (0.65 vs 0.72) is lower
than the comparison group. Prospective Lawyers’ tax compliance rate is in
fact weakly significantly lower (p < 0.10) than the pooled comparison group as
shown in Table 5.3.1. Prospective accountants, on the other hand, behave more
compliantly than the pooled rest as can be seen in Figure 5.3.5(b). Prospective
Accountants are significantly more compliant (p < 0.05) than the comparison
group.
Figure 5.3.6 illustrates the same as the previous graph, however, we have
excluded the other future professional group for which the framing is relevant
(i.e either law or accounting) from the pooled comparison group. Figure 5.3.6(a)
shows the comparison between future law professionals and the pooled rest when
we exclude prospective accounting professionals, and Figure 5.3.6(b) illustrates
the comparison between prospective accounting professionals and the pooled
rest when we exclude future law professionals. The graphs do not change very
much.
When analysing the average profit per round of the different groups, we
can observe in Figure 5.3.7(a) that law students, despite being less compliant,
earn on average less than the comparison group. However, the difference is
insignificant as can be seen in Table 5.3.1. Being more compliant was beneficial
for accounting students in regards to their average profit per round. On average
they earn more than the other group. However, as previously with prospective
lawyers, the difference is not significant (Table 5.3.1).
Relating these results to the tax compliance framing and the respective stu-
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(b) Tax Compliance Rate (Accounting)
Figure 5.3.5: Tax Compliance Rate
two groups. It is found that the tax compliance framing has a stronger influence
on compliance for accounting than for law students. The difference between the
tax compliance rate of accountants and lawyers is significant (p < 0.05), as
shown in the Appendix (Table C.1.1). Although it is very important for ac-
countants and lawyers to behave honestly when filling out a tax return, there
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Figure 5.3.6: Tax Compliance Rate
are the prosecutors but we also want lawyers that do everything to defend their
clients and sometimes this means a lawyer is willing to possibly harm another
individual to defend the interest of a client (see Fried, 1976, for a discussion). It
might not be as negative that future lawyers did not react as strong to the com-
pliance framing as accountants. On the other hand, the fact that accountants
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(b) Payoff Tax Task Accounting
Figure 5.3.7: Average Payoff Tax Task
profession, is indicating that the matching for future accountants is working in
the right direction.
To obtain a better understanding of how the different framings in the dif-
ferent tasks affected the different prospective professional groups behaviour, i.e.
health workers, engineers, lawyers and accountants, in the experiment, a ranking
was developed in which the behaviour of the different groups was rated against
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each other. In particular, how the different groups behaved in the different task
was analysed and the groups were allocated a number between one and four,
where 1 = the most honest behaviour and 4 = the least honest behaviour.
Beginning with the inefficiency variables of undertreatment, overtreatment
and overcharging from the credence goods task, it can be seen in Figure 5.3.8(a)
that engineering students undertreat the most, followed by law and health, while
accounting students behave the most honestly. A similar picture emerges when
Figure 5.3.8(b) is inspected. The only difference is that law students overtreat
the most, followed by engineers and health students. Accountants are again, the
group that behaves the most honestly and overtreats the least. Furthermore,
the propensity to overcharge illustrates a similar picture, as can be seen in
Figure 5.3.9(a). Engineering students overcharge the most, followed by law and
then health and again the student group that behaves in the most honest way
and overcharges the least are the accounting students. Lastly, this study has a
closer look at the payoffs in the credence goods task of patients playing against
a student of one of the respective majors allocated the role of the doctor. This
study is only interested in payoffs of patients since they are price takers in this
task. As depicted in 5.3.9(b), participants in the role of a patient received the
highest payoff when they played against health students allocated the role of the
doctor. The second highest payoff, by participants allocated the role of patients,
was received by playing against law students. The third and the least highest
payoff was received by patients who played against doctors from accounting and
engineering majors respectively. Summarised in Table 5.3.2 we see that after
analysing one task, engineering students are the least honest participants in the
credence goods task since they received three times the highest value of four,
which is equivalent to having behaved the least honestly, and once the second
highest value three.
Moving on to the environmental task and in particular the interest of this
research, which is in the accident self-reporting decision. Self-reporting an ac-
cident incurred a fine as previously mentioned but for this analysis this is con-
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Table 5.3.2: Honesty Comparison Different Major Credence Task
Honesty Variables Health Engineering Law Accounting
Undertreatment 2 4 3 1
Overtreatment 2 3 4 1
Overcharging 2 4 3 1
Payoff Patient 1 4 2 3
Total Honesty Points 7 15 12 6
1= most honest behaviour, 4 = least honest behaviour
sidered to be the honest behaviour. Figure 5.3.10(a) illustrates the accident
self-reporting frequency of the different future professionals. As can be seen,
accounting students have the highest frequency of accident self-reporting, fol-
lowed by engineering, health and the lowest frequency of self-reporting can be
observed by law students. Allocating the values one to four accordingly it can
be seen in Table 5.3.3 that after two tasks, accounting students are still the
most honest student group.
Table 5.3.3: Honesty Comparison Different Major Environmental Task
Honesty Variables Health Engineering Law Accounting
Undertreatment 2 4 3 1
Overtreatment 2 3 4 1
Overcharging 2 4 3 1
Payoff Patient 1 4 2 3
Accident Self-Reporting 3 2 4 1
Total Honesty Points 10 17 16 7
1= most honest behaviour, 4 = least honest behaviour
In the last task we are interested in the ratio of declared income over actual
income. A value close to one indicates a compliant behaviour. As depicted
in Figure 5.3.10(b) we can see that accounting students have the highest tax
compliance rate, followed by engineering, health and law students with the
lowest rate. Assigning the values for the different positions of the last task
we get an overall honesty ranking of the different student groups as illustrated
in Table 5.3.4. Overall accounting students received with quite a margin the
lowest points for all the different tasks. In other words, accountants behaved
the most honestly or more pro-socially compared to the other student groups.
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In fact they are the most honest student group in five out of six measures we
analysed. The runners up in the honesty ranking are health students, tailed by
engineering students and with the least honest student group in this experiment
being law students. Clearly the last place for law students is confirming the
illustrated Gallup Poll results in Figure 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, how people perceive
lawyers in regards to honesty and ethics. In contradiction to the Gallup poll
is the result we obtained for accountants and engineers. While prospective
accountants behaved much better than the poll would have predicted, engineers
students, on the other hand, behaved worse than the public perception would
have predicted.
Table 5.3.4: Honesty Comparison Different Majors Overall
Honesty Variables Health Engineering Law Accounting
Undertreatment 2 4 3 1
Overtreatment 2 3 4 1
Overcharging 2 4 3 1
Payoff Patient 1 4 2 3
Accident Self-Reporting 3 2 4 1
Tax Compliance Rate 3 2 4 1
Total Honesty Points 13 19 20 8





















































Health Engineers Law Accounting
(b) Overtreatment



















































Doctor Patient Doctor Patient Doctor Patient Doctor Patient
Health Engineers Law Accounting
(b) Payoff Credence Goods
Figure 5.3.9: Overcharging & Payoffs
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Figure 5.3.10: Accident Self-Reporting & Tax Compliance Rate
5.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, of interest is the question as to whether individual allocate
themselves efficiently, according to their talents and aptitudes, to their most
suited profession. To answer this question this researcher has conducted a lab-
oratory experiment with health, engineering, law and accounting students. It is
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important to observe the behaviour of future professionals prior to them having
started working in their chosen profession, due to possible heuristics they would
learn, which could influence their behaviour or decisions in our experiment.
In particular, this study examined how a naturalistic framing, relevant to one
of the aforementioned student groups, affects their behaviour compared to the
pooled remaining participants for which the framing is not relevant. Further-
more, to obtain a clearer understanding of the behaviour of the different future
professionals in the experiment, a ranking was also developed by comparing
their decisions in the different tasks and allocating a value, from one being most
honest to four being the least honest accordingly.
Interestingly, it was found that the naturalistic framing affects the behaviour
of future professionals, for whom the framing is relevant, more than the pooled
comparison group. To be precise, future medical professionals in the credence
goods task with medical framing, behave more honestly, i.e. there are less
incidences of undertreatment and overcharging. However, in line with the result
in Chapter 4, they overtreat more than the comparison group. Furthermore,
participants allocated the role of a patient, who played against a future health
professional allocated the role of a doctor, earned on average 1.93 points per
round. This is much higher than the outside option of 1.6 and a remarkable
finding because the patients’ payoff in none of the previous credence goods
studies that analysed a baseline treatment without a naturalistic framing got
anywhere close to the value of the outside option. However, we have to keep in
mind that most of the differences are not statistically significant.
In the second task, an environmental framing that is relevant for prospective
engineers in our participant pool was implemented. The variable of interest is
if participants self-report an accident and incur a fine or do not self-report
an accident and get inspected with a certain probability. It was found that
engineering students self-report an accident with a higher average frequency
than the remaining participants in the experiment. However, the difference is
not significant.
For the last task of the experiment, a tax compliance game, with a public
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goods structure relevant for law and accounting students in our participant
pool, was implemented. This study was specifically interested in the ratio of
the declared income divided by the actual income. The closer the rate is to
one, the more compliant are the participants. Interestingly, for the two groups
for whom the framing is relevant, an opposite result was obtained. While law
students behave weakly significantly noncompliant than the pooled rest of the
participants, accounting students on the other hand, behave significantly (p <
0.05) more compliant than the comparison group.
In addition, a simple ranking was also developed to obtain a clearer under-
standing of how the different future professional groups perform, compared to
each other. For this experiment, it was found that accounting students behave
much more honestly than the rest of the professionals in all but one observation.
Health students follow in the second place, while engineering and law students
occupy the two last positions in this ranking. While for law this is not surprising
- at least when we compare it to the Gallup poll question for honesty and ethics
in professions (see Graph 5.1.1) - for engineering this is unexpected. Overall,
we can conclude that the self-selection for professions such as accounting and
health works, but, for engineering and law professions it does not entirely and
needs more investigation.
However, since these participant numbers are rather low for future health
(21) and law (23) professionals, the results have to be taken with caution; addi-
tionally, with such low participant numbers no policy implication can be outlined
as the results are not robust enough to warrant any suggestion to policy makers.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
6.1 Summary of Findings
This body of work has added to the experimental literature, specifically in cre-
dence goods. The innovation in this work, is derived from the implementation
of a naturalistic or medical framing, and the utilisation of medical professionals
as participants in the experiment. In this thesis, inefficiencies were analysed
in the healthcare market by conducting a series of economics experiments, pri-
marily using the credence goods game. It investigated how a naturalistic or
neutral framing influenced the honest behaviour of different participant pools.
This work is divided into three studies, which addressed different aspects of
the forces driving healthcare costs. Together, all three studies contributed to
the existing literature on credence goods, framing, artefactual field and labo-
ratory experiments. The healthcare market is characterised by an information
asymmetry of an expert seller (doctor) and a consumer (patient). The medical
sector is probably one of the most important sectors that relies highly on expert
services. Credence goods is the term in economics that describes a situation in
which the expert seller knows more about the quality of a good a customer needs
than the customer herself (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2009). Such asymmetries
of information between sellers and consumers may give rise to inefficiencies, such
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as undertreatment, overtreatment and overcharging, and are a major concern.
Unethical experts, for example, can take advantage of this knowledge superi-
ority and abuse their power by providing more treatments than are necessary
or charging a higher price for a treatment they have performed. This research
is particular interested in the behaviour of the participants in the experiments
in regards to honesty. For a society to be functioning well, it is essential that
dishonest and unethical behaviour of experts is virtually non-existent.
Each of the studies included in this thesis utilised the economics of credence
goods and specifically credence goods laboratory experiments to analyse these
inefficiencies, as previously mentioned. In Chapter 3, which served as a baseline
for the following Chapters, the effect of a naturalistic (medical) framing and
its impact on the behaviour of a common student participant pool in regards
to honesty was determined. Chapter 4 extended the analysis in Chapter 3 by
examining the behaviour of medical professionals in a credence goods experi-
mental setting with a neutral framing. Finally, Chapter 5 complements the two
previous studies and translates them into a larger framework. Different future
professional groups were included and their behaviour analysed in regards to
honesty in different naturalistic framed tasks.
This final chapter is organised as follows. The reminder of this section
briefly summarises the studies and outlines the innovation for each. In the
following section, the shortcomings of each study are discussed, followed by
policy implication and finally, the thesis concludes with a section for further
research directions.
In Chapter 3, which serves as a baseline for the following chapters, the focus
is on whether participants behave differently when we apply a naturalistic fram-
ing. We know from psychology that it is important how something is presented.
If the framing of an experiment is relevant to a situation that participants can
relate to, does it change their behaviour. The innovation of this chapter is
the introduction of a medical framing in a credence goods experimental set-
ting. Specifically, interest was in how the framing impacts on the behaviour of
students in relation to the trade, undertreatment, overtreatment and overcharg-
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ing. While the experiment conducted with a neutral framing is a replication of
Dulleck et al. (2011), the results indicate that the participants in the baseline
treatment with a medical framing behave much more honestly than in the neu-
tral framing. For instance, undertreatment was 45 percentage points less likely
to occur in medical framing compared to the neutral framing. However, when
an institutional restriction such as liability or verifiability was implemented, as
strong an effect of medical framing compared to neutral framing, as in our base-
line treatment, was not found. Since with the introduction of liability the action
space of players is limited and undertreatment is impossible, no differences or
even differences that go the wrong direction, between medical and neutral fram-
ings, can be found. However, medical framing also has a minor or no effect when
we introduce verifiability, which is a bit of a surprise. These mixed results for
verifiability suggest that more research into the implementation of naturalistic
framings are needed in a credence goods experimental setting.
In Chapter 4, the analysis of the previous chapter was extended by exam-
ining the behaviour of medical professionals in a credence goods experimental
setting. SID or overtreatment is often seen as a major contributor to the in-
creasing cost in healthcare expenditures. As far as it is known, this is the first
study that has analysed the behaviour of medical professionals by conducting an
artefactual field experiment in a credence goods setting at a large medical con-
ference in Germany. Of particular interest was medical professionals propensity
to overtreat, or in other words, their incentives to induce demand. Specifically,
the baseline treatment in a neutral framing was conducted and compared to
the results that were obtained previously in Chapter 3 with students. It was
observed that medical professionals undertreat and overcharge significantly less,
however, their propensity to overtreat is significantly higher than for the student
reference group. The findings in this chapter are in line with Beck et al. (2014),
who find that car mechanic professionals overtreat significantly more than their
student counterparts in their experiment. One possible explanation for this
finding is a learned decision heuristics of medical professionals in situations of
uncertainty to describe more treatments to prevent future legal proceedings
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against them if medical complication should arise. Beck et al. (2014) also argue
that the difference they observe is a result of the decision rule learned by car
mechanics in the past.
In the first two studies (Chapter 3 and 4) we have analysed the behaviour of
a standard participant pool in a credence goods experiment with medical and a
neutral framing and compared it to the behaviour of medical professionals from
a large conference in Germany in a neutral framed, credence goods experiment.
Chapter 5 complements these two studies and translates them into a larger
framework. In particular, it was of interest whether society allocates people in
an efficient way, such that people choose their most suitable profession according
to their aptitudes and talents required for that job. Furthermore, since these
are professions that occupy important positions within society, an honest and
ethical behaviour should be an essential quality of the people working in it. Do
future professionals behave more honestly when the framing of the experimental
task is relevant to their future professions? To be able to answer this question, a
laboratory experiment was conducted with future health, engineering, law and
accounting professionals. To analyse prospective professionals prior to their
work experience is an advantage, as they have not yet learned heuristics that
could bias their behaviour. The innovation of this study is the utilisation of
three different tasks in one experiment, of which each task has a naturalistic
framing relevant to one of the prospective professional groups. All tasks observe
honesty in a different environment and framing. What was found is that, in the
credence goods task with medical framing, future health professionals behave
more honestly, i.e. less undertreatment, overtreatment and overcharging, than
the pooled comparison group consisting of the other professions. Furthermore,
the payoff paid to the patient by a prospective health professional allocated the
role of a doctor in the credence goods experiment is much higher (1.93) than
the outside option of 1.6. Comparing the results of the patient’s average payoff
(1.93) in medical framing from Chapter 5 to the patient’s average payoff (1.20) in
Chapter 3, it can be seen that future health professionals allocate a much higher
payoff to the patient than participants from a normal student pool. Analysing
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the task and framing that is particularly designed for future engineers in our
participants pool, it is found that engineers self-report an accident, despite
having to pay a fine for sure, more often than the pooled comparison group.
For the last two professional groups, future lawyers and accountants, a tax
compliance experiment with a public goods structure is included. The results are
mixed. While future lawyers behave significantly less compliantly than the com-
parison group, prospective accountants on the other hand behave significantly
more compliantly. Although it is very important for accountants and lawyers
to behave honestly when filling out a tax return, there is a double standard for
lawyers. For example, we want honest lawyers that are the persecutors but we
also want the lawyers that do everything to defend their clients and sometimes
this means a lawyer is willing to possibly harm another individual to defend the
interest of a client (see Fried, 1976, for a discussion). Therefore, it might not
be as unexpected that future lawyers did not react as strong to the compliance
framing as accountants. On the other hand accountants behave significantly
more honestly, when the framing is relevant to their future profession, which
is indicating that the matching for future accountants is working in the right
direction.
Moreover, when a ranking was developed in relation to the decisions of
the different future professional groups in the different tasks, it could be seen
that future accountants behave the most honestly in comparison to all other
groups, followed by future health and engineering professionals. The least hon-
est prospective professional group are the lawyers in our experiment, which is
in line with the public perception expressed in the Gallup Poll, where lawyers
received the lowest rating for the groups included in this study1 However, since
this research only has a very limited number of observations, the results have





Part of the increasing cost of healthcare is driven by doctors behaviour learned
in training. For major treatments or difficult diagnosis, having a policy of
forced second opinion could lower overtreatment. The cost of obtaining a second
opinion is much more likely to be significantly lower than the cost of unnecessary
treatments. By doing this it would, for doctors, reduce the fear of litigation,
since there is a second opinion, which would also reduce the need to overtreat.
As a result patients are better off (second opinion catches more misdiagnosis),
doctors are better off (less litigation and better diagnosis), and lastly it lowers
the burden on the health care system by reducing costs.
6.3 Shortcomings
In this section, the main shortcomings of each study which have been discussed
in the respective chapters, are outlined. An important shortcoming in Chapter
3 is the fact the no medical students were recruited as participants in the ex-
periment. It would have been interesting to observe, if medical students behave
differently compared to a standard participant pool. With respect to Chapter
4, the main limitation is the rather low participant number in the experiment.2
It makes it difficult to formulate policy implications because low participant
numbers normally imply results that lack robustness. Increasing the partici-
pant numbers will not only help to obtain a more robust result, it will also
help to increase the probability that what we observe is indicative of the larger
population. Furthermore, in Chapter 4 the study was unable to conduct a
naturalistically framed experiment with medical professionals that would have
given it a better understanding and a nice comparison of the behaviour between
2Recruiting participants at a medical conference in Germany turned out to be much harder
than expected. The conference sessions were very well attended and not many participants
were wandering around that we could have approached. Also, the design of the experiment
did not help as we needed at least 8 people to concurrently participate in the experiment.
While this is not a problem when running experiments in a laboratory at a university it is a
large flaw when running experiments at a conference.
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medical professionals and a student subject pool in such framed experiments.
An important limitation in Chapter 4 is related to the fact that only the be-
haviour of medical professionals from one particular country with one medical
pay scheme was analysed. It might well be the case that different schemes in
different countries foster a different behaviour of physicians and therefore these
conclusions or recommendations would not apply. Furthermore, running a rep-
utation treatment similar to Dulleck et al. (2011)would have been closer to a
real world interaction between a doctor and a patient as well. A further caveat
might be the fact that a risk aversion task has not been included in the ques-
tionnaire. It could have helped to explain a bit more the higher overtreatment
results of medical professionals as the SID problem and the fear of litigation of
physicians for malpractice might be related to their risk attributes. Moreover,
the artificial environment of the lab combined with an abstract framing could
also be a problem for the behaviour of medical professionals.
In Chapter 5, one of the main limitations is a similar problem to that previ-
ously discussed in Chapter 4. The low participant numbers in the experiment
does not allow for policy implication to be formulated or drawn from.3 Further-
more, QUT also does not have a medical college, hence, the subject pool does
not consist of prospective doctors. However, since doctors are the main focus
of this thesis and the people of most interest, it is difficult to derive conclusions
and extrapolate them to a wider medical audience.
6.4 Further Research
The credence goods inefficiency problem of undertreatment, overtreatment and
overcharging, affects every country around the globe. However, most, if not
all, credence goods experiments were conducted in a German speaking country.
Hence, a logical extension of Chapter 3 would be to conduct experiments in
different countries as it would be interesting to conduct country comparisons
3Not using the normal business student participant pool created some problems. The
recruitment of medical and law students turned out to be the biggest challenge for this part
of my thesis.
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with different student participant pools to see if participants in other countries
behave similarly or not. Oosterbeek et al. (2004) conducted a meta-analysis
on ultimatum game experiments. In 37 papers from 25 different countries they
analysed, they find no statistical differences between the behaviour of the pro-
posers, however, the behaviour of the responders across regions is different.
Hence, investigating whether the credence goods dilemma is similar across or
more prevalent in certain countries than in others, is important when formu-
lating policies that are addressing a countrys particular circumstance. Further-
more, the same experiments could be run with medical students to investigate if
a naturalistic framing relating to their chosen professions has a larger influence
(i.e. more honest) on their behaviour when compared to a standard participant
pool.
The analysis in Chapter 4 of this thesis allows for a number of extensions.
The most straight forward, but not necessarily the easiest, is to increase the
participant number in the experiment, as we only have 40 participants from
Germany. Since the experiment run was in a neutral framing and the doctors
could not really relate the context of the experiment to familiar situation it can-
not be positively ascertained that the behaviour of medical professionals would
be the same when a medical framing was introduced. For example, Cooper
et al. (1999) found that the context framing influenced the behaviour of man-
agers much more compared to students than the neutral framing. Moreover,
Cohn et al. (2014) found that banking professionals behave less honestly if the
framing of the experiment relates to a financial environment compared to a
neutral framing. They believe that this is due to the culture that has currently
taken place in the financial sector. Hence, it might well be the same for doc-
tors that if the framing relates to a familiar situation, they behave differently
than in the neutral framing conducted here. In addition, as the SID problem in
the healthcare sector is not only relevant to doctors, it could be interesting to
broadening the base of healthcare professionals. To investigate dentists would
be a logical and interesting extension due to the similarities with physicians
and the characteristics of the expert patient relationship. The dentist-patient
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relationship might even suffer more from inefficiencies such as overtreatment
and overcharging than the doctor patient interaction. Moreover, it would also
be interesting to investigate doctors’ risk attitudes. A risk-averse doctor might
prescribe more treatments when the diagnosis is not straightforward due to the
fear of litigation, while a risk-seeking doctor might not care much. Running a
credence experiment with a Holt and Laury (2002) task in the post survey of
the experiment or a task designed by (Dohmen et al., 2011), which is specifi-
cally relevant in a medical domain, would be a logical extension of this study
as the risk attitudes of the doctors could be easily compared to the overtreat-
ment decision made in the experiment. Finally, as many countries have different
medical pay schemes, running the same experiment in different countries could
be interesting, as different medical systems may foster different behaviour of
doctors.
Similarly, Chapter 5 of this thesis also offers numerous extensions which
could be interesting to pursue. The first and main point would be to increase
the number of subjects in the experiment, as we only had 21 health, 23 law,
32 accountants and 32 engineering students that participated. Answering the
question if society allocates the people correctly is an important question that
needs to be addressed. It can cost society a vast amount of resources and money
if this is not efficiently executed. Hence, extending the participant number is
only the beginning. More professions that occupy important positions within
society should be included in future studies. For example, dishonest bankers
can harm society significantly, as the recent global financial crisis has shown.
Furthermore, the wording of the tax compliance task could be changed in a
future experiment to better emphasise the interaction between an expert and
client. Instead of writing taxes payable on your declared income this could have
been phrased such that the participants in the experiments are tax profession-
als who have to fill out a tax return for a client to incorporate the credence
goods dilemma further and go towards the direction of the study conducted by
Balafoutas et al. (2015a), which investigated tax compliance utilising a credence
goods experiment. A further extension could also be to narrow this down to only
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health students. Would we observe a different behaviour of prospective doctors
compared to nurses, paramedics or pharmacists - as incentives for pharmacists
might be completely different than incentives for nurses - for example?
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A.1 Individual Participant Averages
Table A.1.1: Overview of Results - Neutral Framing
Averages per Period Baseline Liability Verifiability
Undertreatmenta,b 0.67 — 0.44
Overtreatmenta,c 0.10 0.07 0.19
Overcharginga,d 0.81 0.70 —
Number of participants 32 32 32
a relative frequency.
b consumer needs th, but seller provides tl.
c consumer needs tl, but seller provides th.
d seller provides tl, but charges ph (with pl ≤ ph and consumer requiring tl).
Table A.1.2: Overview of Results - Medical Framing
Averages per Period Baseline Liability Verifiability
Undertreatment 0.33 — 0.50
Overtreatment 0.01 0.04 0.24
Overcharging 0.65 0.63 —
Number of participants 48 48 48
Note: See previous table’s footnotes for a definition of the variables.
Table A.1.3: Overview Ranksum Test Results - Medical vs Neutral Framing
Medical - Neutral Framing, Mean Diff. (|z − valuee|)
Averages per Period Baseline Liability Verifiability
Undertreatmenta,b -0.34 (4.38)*** — 0.06 (0.57)
Overtreatmenta,c -0.09 (3.56)*** -0.03 (0.65) 0.05 (1.04)
Overcharginga,d -0.16 (2.14)** -0.07 (0.76) —
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
a relative frequency.
b consumer needs th, but seller provides tl.
c consumer needs tl, but seller provides th.
d seller provides tl, but charges ph (with pl ≤ ph and consumer requiring tl).
e Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test where Ho: variablei(medical==0) = variablei(medical==1).
A.2 Difference between Baseline and
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A.2 Difference between Baseline and
Verifiability
Table A.2.1: Baseline vs Verifiability
Baseline - Verifiability, Mean Diff. (|z − valueg|)
Averages per Period Neutral Framing Medical Framing
Tradea 0.02 (0.75) 0.07 (2.78)***
Efficiencyb -0.06 (2.52)** 0.18 (10.96)***
Undertreatmenta,c 0.24 (5.44)*** -0.17 (5.01)***
Overtreatmenta,d -0.08 (2.59)*** -0.24 (9.71)***
Overcharginga,e ————
pl with trade -1.26 (8.37)*** -0.92 (9.48)***
pl without trade -1.42 (8.57)*** 0.93 (7.06)***
ph with trade -1.08 (8.25)*** -0.38 (6.22)***
ph without trade -0.78 (6.17)*** -0.38 (4.02)***
Actually charged price -0.18 (0.93) 0.67 (7.05)***
Profits sellersf 0.37 (6.43)*** 0.55 (6.96)***
Profits consumersf -0.51 (7.88)*** -0.05 (2.58)***
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
a relative frequency.
b calculated as (actual average profit - outside option) / (maximum possible av-
erage profit - outside option)
c consumer needs th, but seller provides tl.
d consumer needs tl, but seller provides th.
e seller provides tl, but charges ph (with pl ≤ ph and consumer requiring tl).
f in experimental currency units, in medical framing sellers = doctors and con-
sumers = patients.
g Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test where Ho: variablei(baseline==0) =
variablei(baseline==1).
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Table A.3.1: OLS Regression - Trade
Trade Trade Trade Trade
Variables Baseline Liability Verifiability Overall
Medical 0.204*** 0.003 0.070 0.090***
(4.35) (0.07) (1.48) (3.41)
Price Low -0.012 -0.022*** -0.048*** -0.028***
(-1.27) (-2.64) (-4.67) (-5.08)
Price High -0.148*** -0.155*** -0.125*** -0.133***
(-14.57) (-10.15) (-8.33) (-17.07)
Period 1-3 0.169*** -0.197*** 0.197*** 0.062***
(5.20) (-6.05) (5.89) (2.78)
Period 4-8 0.157*** -0.023 0.157*** 0.099***





Constant 1.593*** 2.077*** 1.736*** 1.651***
(18.84) (16.62) (10.98) (24.37)
F 75.983*** 45.372*** 31.816*** 77.904***
Pr(F > f) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2Adjusted 0.172 0.258 0.153 0.178
N (Clusters) 80 80 80 240
N (Obs.) 1280 1280 1280 3840
Notes: Clustered standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses. The reference
groups consist of NEUTRAL, PERIOD 9-16 and BASELINE. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.3.2: OLS Regression - Undertreatment
Undertreatment Undertreatment Undertreatment
Variables Baseline Verifiability Overall
Medical -0.364*** 0.077 -0.134**
(-6.27) (1.22) (-2.50)
Price Low -0.130*** 0.127*** 0.004
(-8.34) (7.25) (0.23)
Price High 0.041** -0.146*** -0.074***
(2.50) (-8.29) (-4.54)
Period 1-3 -0.171*** 0.020 -0.080**
(-3.61) (0.42) (-2.12)




Constant 1.044*** 0.910*** 1.139***
(8.80) (5.31) (10.41)
F 66.879*** 22.936*** 12.822***
Pr(F > f) 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2Adjusted 0.299 0.238 0.071
N (Clusters) 80 80 160
N (Obs.) 666 648 1314
Notes: Clustered standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses. The reference groups
consist of NEUTRAL, PERIOD 9-16 and BASELINE. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.3.3: OLS Regression - Overtreatment
Overtreatment Overtreatment Overtreatment Overtreatment
Variables Baseline Liability Verifiability Overall
Medical -0.093*** -0.015 0.040 -0.023
(-3.41) (-0.73) (1.03) (-1.14)
Price Low 0.016** -0.008 -0.112*** -0.036***
(2.16) (-1.52) (-8.26) (-5.23)
Price High -0.003 -0.013 0.102*** 0.031***
(-0.41) (-1.21) (7.16) (3.51)
Period 1-3 0.115*** 0.141*** 0.022 0.130***
(3.06) (4.20) (0.50) (5.58)
Period 4-8 0.020 0.017 0.030 0.041***





Constant 0.031 0.168* -0.037 -0.055
(0.55) (1.89) (-0.28) (-0.94)
F 3.207** 5.230*** 22.771*** 18.805***
Pr(F > f) 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2Adjusted 0.102 0.080 0.229 0.136
N (Clusters) 80 80 80 240
N (Obs.) 614 624 632 1870
Notes: Clustered standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses. The reference groups consist of
NEUTRAL, PERIOD 9-16 and BASELINE. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.3.4: OLS Regression - Overcharging
Overcharging Overcharging Overcharging
Variables Baseline Liability Overall
Medical -0.119*** -0.108* -0.110***
(-2.86) (-1.93) (-3.13)
Price Low -0.131*** -0.070*** -0.102***
(-10.18) (-5.74) (-10.76)
Price High 0.054*** 0.023* 0.041***
(3.70) (1.75) (3.85)
Period 1-3 -0.085* -0.394*** -0.206***
(-1.84) (-6.59) (-5.41)




Constant 1.022*** 0.975*** 1.011***
(9.89) (9.55) (12.74)
F 25.220*** 35.974*** 40.881***
Pr(F > f) 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2Adjusted 0.249 0.183 0.206
N (Clusters) 80 80 160
N (Obs.) 882 596 1478
Notes: Clustered standard errors, t-statistics in parentheses. The reference
groups consist of NEUTRAL, PERIOD 9-16 and BASELINE. *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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B.1 Experimental Room Setup in Hamburg
Figure B.1.1: Room Setup DEGAM
B.2 Individual Participant Averages 133
B.2 Individual Participant Averages
Table B.2.1: Overview of Baseline Results Medical Professionals vs Students
Neutral Framing
Averages per Period Medical Prof. Students
Mean Diff.
(|z − valuee|)
Undertreatmenta,b 0.49 0.67 -0.18 (2.48)**
Overtreatmenta,c 0.20 0.10 0.10 (2.63)***
Overcharginga,d 0.61 0.81 -0.20 (2.48)**
Number of participants 40 32
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
a relative frequency.
b patient needs th, but seller provides tl.
c patient needs tl, but seller provides th.
d doctor provides tl, but charges ph (with pl ≤ ph and consumer requiring tl).
e Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test where Ho: variablei(Medicalprof == 0) =
variablei(Medicalprof == 1).
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B.3.1 Demographic Variables
Table B.3.1: Probit Regression - Including Demographic Variables
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Trade Undertreatment Overtreatment Overcharging
Medical Prof. 0.427** -0.749*** 0.603*** -1.172***
(2.41) (-3.77) (3.10) (-6.13)
0.168 -0.282 0.119 -0.259
Price Low -0.022 -0.388*** 0.197*** -0.572***
(-0.91) (-8.21) (6.08) (-6.16)
-0.009 -0.150 0.041 -0.128
Price High -0.225*** 0.156*** -0.006 0.405***
(-6.98) (3.47) (-0.14) (5.33)
-0.089 0.060 -0.001 0.091
Period 1-3 0.373*** -0.495*** 0.857*** -0.505***
(3.80) (-2.59) (5.30) (-2.91)
0.143 -0.194 0.231 -0.134
Period 4-8 0.331*** -0.575*** 0.146 -0.205*
(4.22) (-4.24) (1.04) (-1.78)
0.128 -0.223 0.032 -0.048
Age -0.007 0.010 0.005 0.009
(-0.62) (1.14) (0.52) (0.43)
-0.003 0.004 0.001 0.002
Male -0.149 -0.131 -0.020 -0.145
(-0.89) (-0.67) (-0.12) (-0.71)
-0.059 -0.051 -0.004 -0.033
Constant 1.851*** 1.258*** -2.607*** 0.787
(4.94) (3.28) (-5.66) (1.47)
χ2 69.032*** 101.955*** 144.998*** 90.449***
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(Pseudo) R2 0.095 0.203 0.142 0.327
N (Clusters) 72 72 72 72
N (Obs.) 1152 550 602 824
Notes: Clustered standard errors, z-statistics in parentheses and marginal effects in italics. The
reference groups consist of STUDENTS, PERIOD 9-16 and FEMALES. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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B.3.2 Results with QUT and IBK included
Table B.3.2: Probit Regression - IBK as Reference Group
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Trade Undertreatment Overtreatment Overcharging
Medical Prof. 0.350** -0.549*** 0.602*** -1.088***
(2.21) (-3.03) (3.24) (-6.08)
0.137 -0.214 0.138 -0.276
QUT 0.177 -0.519*** 0.380* -0.642***
(1.29) (-2.60) (1.92) (-3.17)
0.069 -0.203 0.089 -0.160
Price Low -0.037** -0.204*** 0.150*** -0.533***
(-2.17) (-5.90) (4.73) (-8.58)
-0.015 -0.080 0.033 -0.116
Price High -0.179*** 0.109*** -0.003 0.432***
(-6.83) (3.12) (-0.11) (7.43)
-0.071 0.043 -0.001 0.094
Period 1-3 0.524*** -0.624*** 0.894*** -0.474***
(6.12) (-4.31) (6.90) (-3.43)
0.198 -0.245 0.247 -0.122
Period 4-8 0.386*** -0.504*** 0.187 0.054
(5.85) (-4.91) (1.52) (0.49)
0.150 -0.197 0.042 0.012
Constant 1.280*** 0.861*** -2.311*** 0.478*
(5.89) (3.02) (-7.78) (1.81)
χ2 93.931*** 104.296*** 108.188*** 137.022***
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(Pseudo) R2 0.084 0.115 0.124 0.320
N (Clusters) 104 104 104 104
N (Obs.) 1664 800 864 1182
Notes: Clustered standard errors, z-statistics in parentheses and marginal effects in italics.
The reference groups consist of IBK STUDENTS and PERIOD 9-16. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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B.3.3 Results for Panel Regressions
Table B.3.3: Probit Random Effects Panel Regressions - Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Trade Undertreatment Overtreatment Overcharging
Medical Prof. 0.569*** -0.789*** 0.747*** -1.377***
(2.67) (-3.35) (3.26) (-4.52)
0.181 -0.235 0.137 -0.251
Price Low -0.014 -0.379*** 0.205*** -0.707***
(-0.48) (-7.60) (5.23) (-7.52)
-0.004 -0.113 0.037 -0.129
Price High -0.376*** 0.160*** 0.002 0.534***
(-9.68) (3.20) (0.05) (7.57)
-0.120 0.048 0.000 0.098
Period 1-3 0.484*** -0.758*** 0.981*** -0.744***
(3.75) (-3.27) (5.30) (-2.98)
0.154 -0.226 0.179 -0.136
Period 4-8 0.455*** -0.735*** 0.178 -0.457***
(4.73) (-4.53) (1.11) (-3.12)
0.145 -0.219 0.033 -0.084
Constant 2.632*** 1.541*** -2.867*** 1.023***
(8.07) (3.79) (-6.83) (2.63)
χ2 135.172*** 90.001*** 60.463*** 115.999***
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N (Clusters) 72 72 72 72
N (Obs.) 1152 550 602 824
Notes: Clustered standard errors, z-statistics in parentheses and marginal effects in italics. The
reference groups consist of STUDENTS and PERIOD 9-16. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table B.3.4: Probit Random Effects Panel Regressions - Bootstrapped
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Trade Undertreatment Overtreatment Overcharging
Medical Prof. 0.569*** -0.789*** 0.747*** -1.377***
(5.44) (-4.60) (4.34) (-5.11)
0.181 -0.235 0.137 -0.251
Price Low -0.014 -0.379*** 0.205*** -0.707***
(-0.52) (-5.54) (4.09) (-6.86)
-0.004 -0.113 0.037 -0.129
Price High -0.376*** 0.160*** 0.002 0.534***
(-9.30) (2.94) (0.05) (5.96)
-0.120 0.048 0.000 0.098
Period 1-3 0.484*** -0.758*** 0.981*** -0.744***
(2.95) (-2.88) (4.13) (-2.87)
0.154 -0.226 0.179 -0.136
Period 4-8 0.455*** -0.735*** 0.178 -0.457***
(4.24) (-3.98) (0.90) (-2.63)
0.145 -0.219 0.033 -0.084
Constant 2.632*** 1.541*** -2.867*** 1.023*
(9.09) (3.49) (-6.13) (1.84)
χ2 120.245*** 46.477*** 36.625*** 61.507***
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N (Clusters) 72 72 72 72
N (Obs.) 1152 550 602 824
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors (200 reps based on 72 clusters in number), z-statistics
in parentheses and marginal effects in italics. The reference groups consist of STUDENTS and
PERIOD 9-16. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table B.3.5: Random Effects Panel Regressions - Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Trade Undertreatment Overtreatment Overcharging
Medical Prof. 0.137** -0.219*** 0.129*** -0.272***
(2.39) (-3.66) (3.52) (-5.00)
Price Low 0.001 -0.101*** 0.042*** -0.095***
(0.11) (-10.05) (4.75) (-7.86)
Price High -0.090*** 0.041*** 0.008 0.068***
(-11.09) (3.23) (0.95) (9.53)
Period 1-3 0.114*** -0.191*** 0.216*** -0.150***
(3.37) (-3.25) (4.60) (-3.35)
Period 4-8 0.119*** -0.188*** 0.021 -0.062**
(4.16) (-4.56) (0.73) (-2.54)
Constant 1.107*** 0.919*** -0.203*** 0.761***
(13.96) (9.05) (-2.85) (12.22)
R2 Overall 0.112 0.236 0.127 0.278
χ2 157.065*** 176.121*** 94.302*** 128.653***
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N (Clusters) 72 72 72 72
N (Obs.) 1152 550 602 824
Notes: Clustered standard errors and z-statistics in parentheses. The reference groups consist
of STUDENTS and PERIOD 9-16. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
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C.1 Ranksum Test Between Different Majors
Table C.1.1: Wilcoxon Ranksum Test Results
Interact, Mean Diff. (|z − value|)
Majors Health Engineering Law Accounting
Health —
Engineering 0.04 (1.05) —
Law 0.15 (3.18)*** 0.10 (2.45)** —
Accounting 0.07 (1.55) 0.02 (0.57) -0.08 (1.93)* —
Undertreatment, Mean Diff. (|z − value|)
Health —
Engineering -0.10 (1.73)* —
Law -0.04 (0.60) 0.06 (1.06) —
Accounting 0.00 (0.03) 0.10 (1.92)* 0.04 (0.68) —
Overtreatment, Mean Diff. (|z − value|)
Health —
Engineering 0.00 (0.06) —
Law -0.02 (0.48) -0.02 (0.62) —
Accounting 0.05 (1.69)* 0.05 (1.81)* 0.07 (2.33)** —
Overcharging, Mean Diff. (|z − value|)
Health —
Engineering -0.13 (2.49)** —
Law -0.08 (1.29) 0.05 (1.13) —
Accounting 0.00 (0.07) 0.12 (2.77)*** 0.07 (1.38) —
Accident Self Reporting, Mean Diff. (|z − value|)
Health —
Engineering -0.04 (0.74) —
Law 0.01 (0.24) 0.05 (1.02) —
Accounting -0.05 (0.98) -0.01 (0.26) -0.06 (1.27) —
Tax Compliance Rate, Mean Diff.(|z − value|)
Health —
Engineering 0.00 0.18 —
Law 0.05 0.79 0.05 (0.90) —
Accounting -0.04 (1.39) -0.04 (1.54) -0.09 (2.50)** —
Participants 21 32 23 32
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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C.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table C.2.1: Summary Statistics for Health Participants
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Trade 0.67 0.47 0 1 210
Undertreatment 0.29 0.46 0 1 114
Overtreatment 0.09 0.29 0 1 96
Overcharging 0.63 0.48 0 1 120
Payoff Doctor 2.47 2.28 -4 7 120
Payoff Patient 1.86 3.64 -9 8 90
Accident Self Reporting 0.30 0.46 0 1 142
Tax Compliance Rate 0.70 0.39 0 1.5 210
Table C.2.2: Summary Statistics for Engineering Participants
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Trade 0.62 0.49 0 1 320
Undertreatment 0.39 0.49 0 1 156
Overtreatment 0.09 0.29 0 1 164
Overcharging 0.76 0.43 0 1 210
Payoff Doctor 3.29 1.97 -1 8 120
Payoff Patient 1.04 3.63 -8 7 200
Self Report 0.33 0.47 0 1 213
Tax Compliance Rate 0.70 0.39 0 1.5 320
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Table C.2.3: Summary Statistics for Law Participants
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Trade 0.52 0.50 0 1 230
Undertreatment 0.33 0.47 0 1 107
Overtreatment 0.11 0.32 0 1 123
Overcharging 0.71 0.46 0 1 144
Payoff Doctor 2.52 2.40 -4 9 110
Payoff Patient 1.85 3.28 -11 9 120
Accident Self Reporting 0.28 0.45 0 1 152
Tax Compliance Rate 0.65 0.41 0 1.2 230
Table C.2.4: Summary Statistics for Accounting Participants
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Trade 0.60 0.49 0 1 320
Undertreatment 0.29 0.45 0 1 153
Overtreatment 0.04 0.20 0 1 167
Overcharging 0.64 0.48 0 1 204
Payoff Doctor 2.69 1.95 0 9 190
Payoff Patient 1.84 2.86 -8 8 130
Accident Self Reporting 0.35 0.48 0 1 223
Tax Compliance Rate 0.74 0.37 0 1.5 320
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D.1 Experimental Instructions
D.1.1 Experimental Instructions Baseline Neutral
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment. Please do not to
talk to any other participant until the end of the experiment. Please turn off
your mobile phone or put it into flight mode.
2 Roles and 16 Rounds
This experiment consists of 16 Rounds, each of which has the same sequence
of decisions. The sequence of decisions is explained in detail below.
There are 2 roles in this experiment: Player A and Player B. At the beginning
of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to one role and remain in that
role throughout the experiment. On the first screen of the experiment you will
see which role you have been assigned to.
Player A always interacts with Player B. However, the pair will change after
each round, meaning that in each round you will interact with a different
participant (in the opposite role).
All participants receive exactly the same information regarding the rules of the
game, including information about costs and payoffs of both players.
Overview of the Sequence of Decisions in a Round
Each round consists of a maximum of 4 decisions, which are made sequentially.
Decisions 1, 3 and 4 are made by Player A, Decision 2 is made by Player B. At
the start of the round Player B is randomly assigned a type (Type I or Type
II).
D.1 Experimental Instructions 145
Sequence of Decisions in a Round (in short)
1. Player A chooses a price for Action I and a price for Action II.
2. Player B is informed about the prices chosen by Player A. Player B then
decides whether they want to interact with Player A.
3. Player A (but not Player B) is informed about the type of Player B. Then
Player A is asked to choose either Action I or Action II.
4. Player A charges one of the prices specified in Decision 1. The price
charged does not necessarily have to be the price for the action actually
chosen by Player A in Decision 3, it can also be the price of the other
action.
5. The results of this round, based on the decisions of Player A and Player
B, will be announced.
Detailed Description of the Decisions and their
Consequences in Terms of Payoffs
Decision 1
Player A will later choose between two actions, Action I and Action II.
For Action I Player A incurs costs of 2 points (=experimental currency).
For Action II Player A incurs costs of 6 points.
Player A can charge prices for these actions from Player B. In Decision 1
Player A has to set the prices (in points) for both actions. Both prices have
to be positive integers between 1 and 11, i.e., only 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 or
11 are valid prices. Also, the price for Action I must not exceed the price for
Action II.
Decision 2
Player B is informed about the prices set by Player A for the two actions in
Decision 1. Then Player B decides whether they want to interact with Player
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A.
If Player B decides not to interact, the round ends and both players receive
a payoff of 1.6 points for this round.
If Player B decides to interact, Player A can choose an action in Decision 3 and
charge a price for this action in Decision 4. Player B is not able to observe
which action is chosen by Player A.
Decision 3
At the beginning of the round Player B was randomly assigned a type. Player
B can be one of two types: Type I or Type II.
Player B is with a 50% of Type I and with a 50% of Type II. Imagine that
a coin is tossed for each Player B in each round. If the coin comes up “heads”,
Player B is of Type I, if it comes up as “tails”, Player B is of Type II.
Player A is informed about the type of Player B before they enter Decision
3. Then Player A chooses an action for Player B, either Action I or Action II.
An action is sufficient under the following conditions:
• Player B is of Type I and Player A either chooses Action I or Action II.
• Player B is of Type II and Player A chooses Action II..
An action is insufficient, if Player B is of Type II and Player A chooses Action
I.
Player B receives 10 points, if Player A did choose a sufficient action.
Player B receives 0 points if Player A did choose an insufficient action.
Player B will never be informed whether they are of Type I or Type II or which
action Player A has chosen.
Decision 4
Player A charges Player B one of the two prices specified in Decision 1 for
the two actions. This price does not have to be the price of the action actually
chosen in Decision 3, but could also be the price of the other action.
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Payoffs
If Player B chooses not to interact with Player A (decision “Don’t interact”
by Player B) both players get 1.6 points for the round.
Otherwise (decision “Interact” by Player B) the payoffs are as follows:
Player A receives the price (denoted in points) charged in Decision 4 minus
the costs for the action chosen in Decision 3.
Player B’s payoff depends on whether the action chosen by Player A in Decision
3 was sufficient.
• If the action chosen by Player A was sufficient, Player B receives 10 points
minus the price charged in Decision 4. .
• If the action was insufficient, Player B has to pay the price charged in
Decision 4.
At the beginning of the experiment you receive an initial endowment of 10
points. You are able to cover losses that might occur in some rounds with
this initial endowment. Furthermore, losses can also be compensated by gains
in other rounds. If your total payoff is negative at the end of the experiment,
you will have to pay this amount to the supervisor of the experiment. By
participating in this experiment you agree to this condition. Please note that it
is always possible to avoid losses in this experiment.
To calculate your total earnings the initial endowment and the profits from all
rounds are added up. This sum is then converted into cash using the following
exchange rate:
1 point = 50 Cent
(i.e. 2 points = 1 Dollar)
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D.1.2 Experimental Instructions Baseline Medical
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment. Please do not to
talk to any other participant until the end of the experiment. Please turn off
your mobile phone or put it into flight mode.
2 Roles and 16 Rounds
This experiment consists of 16 Rounds, each of which has the same sequence
of decisions. The sequence of decisions is explained in detail below.
There are 2 roles in this experiment: Doctors and Patients. At the beginning
of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to one role and remain in that
role throughout the experiment. On the first screen of the experiment you will
see which role you have been assigned to.
A doctor always interacts with a patient. However, the pair will change after
each round, meaning that in each round you will interact with a different
participant (in the opposite role).
All participants receive exactly the same information regarding the rules of the
game, including information about costs and payoffs of both players.
Overview of the Sequence of Decisions in a Round
Each round consists of a maximum of 4 decisions, which are made sequentially.
Decisions 1, 3 and 4 are made by doctors; Decision 2 is made by patients. In
each round, a patient has either a minor or a severe illness. Without knowing
the gravity of their illness, a patient has to decide if they want to be examined
by a doctor or not. If a patient seeks an examination, a doctor will then perform
a diagnosis by which they can determine the gravity of the illness for certain.
Following the diagnosis a doctor will then administer a normal or a special
intravenous drip to a patient.
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Sequence of Decisions in a Round (in short)
1. The doctor chooses a price for the normal intravenous drip and a price for
the special intravenous drip.
2. The patient is informed about the prices chosen by the doctor. The patient
then decides whether they want to be examined by the doctor.
3. If the doctor performs a diagnosis, then the doctor (however not the
patient) learns for certain if the patient has the minor or severe illness.
The doctor then selects the normal or the special intravenous drip.
4. The doctor charges from the patients one of the prices specified in Decision
1. The price charged does not necessarily have to be the price for the
intravenous drip actually chosen by the doctor in Decision 3, it can also
be the price of the other intravenous drip.
5. The results of this round, based on the decisions of the doctor and the
patient, will be announced.
Detailed Description of the Decisions and their
Consequences in Terms of Payoffs
Decision 1
The doctor will later choose between two infusions, the normal and special
intravenous drip.
For the normal intravenous drip doctors incur costs of 2 points (=experi-
mental currency).
For the special intravenous drip doctors incur costs of 6 points.
Doctors can charge prices for these infusions from patients. In Decision 1 the
doctor has to set the price (in points) for both infusions. Both prices have
to be positive integers between 1 and 11, i.e., only 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
or 11 are valid prices. Also, the price for the normal intravenous drip must not
exceed the price for the special intravenous drip.
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Decision 2
The patient is informed about the prices set by the doctor for the two infusions
in Decision 1. Then the patient decides whether they want to be examined by
the doctor.
If the patient decides not to be examined, the round ends and both partici-
pants receive a payoff of 1.6 points for this round.
If the patient decides to be examined, the doctor can choose an intravenous drip
in Decision 3 and charge a price for this intravenous drip in Decision 4. The
patient is not able to observe which intravenous drip is chosen by the doctor.
Decision 3
At the beginning of the round a patient was randomly assigned an illness. A
patient can have one of two illnesses: the minor illness or the severe ill-
ness.
Patients have with a 50% chance the minor illness and with a 50% chance
the severe illness. Imagine that a coin is tossed for each patient in each round.
If the coin comes up “heads”, the patient has the minor illness, if it comes up
as “tails”, the patient has the severe illness.
The doctor is informed about the illness of the patient before they enter
Decision 3. Then the doctor chooses an intravenous drip for the patient, either
the normal intravenous drip or the special intravenous drip.
An intravenous drip is sufficient under the following conditions:
• The patient has the minor illness and the doctor either administers the
normal or the special intravenous drip.
• The patient has the severe illness and the doctor administers the special
intravenous drip.
An intravenous drip is insufficient, if the patient has the severe illness and the
doctor administered the normal intravenous drip.
The patient receives 10 points, if the doctor administered a sufficient in-
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travenous drip. The patient receives 0 points if the doctor administered an
insufficient intravenous drip.
The patient will never be informed whether they have the minor illness or the
severe illness and which intravenous drip the doctor administered.
Decision 4
The Doctor charges the patient one of the two prices specified in Decision 1
for the infusions. This price does not have to be the price of the intravenous
drip actually chosen in Decision 3, but could also be the price of the other
intravenous drip.
Payoffs
If the patient chooses not to be examined by the doctor (decision “No exam-
ination” by the patient) both players get 1.6 points for the round.
Otherwise (decision “Examination” by the patient) the payoffs are as follows:
The doctor receives the price (denoted in points) charged in Decision 4 minus
the costs for the intravenous drip administered in Decision 3.
The patients payoff depends on whether the intravenous drip administered by
the doctor in Decision 3 was sufficient.
• If the intravenous drip administered by the doctor was sufficient, the pa-
tient receives 10 points minus the price charged in Decision 4.
• If the intravenous drip administered was insufficient, the patient has to
pay the price charged in Decision 4.
At the beginning of the experiment you receive an initial endowment of 10
points. You are able to cover losses that might occur in some rounds with
this initial endowment. Furthermore, losses can also be compensated by gains
in other rounds. If your total payoff is negative at the end of the experiment,
you will have to pay this amount to the supervisor of the experiment. By
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participating in this experiment you agree to this condition. Please note that it
is always possible to avoid losses in this experiment.
To calculate your total earnings the initial endowment and the profits from all
rounds are added up. This sum is then converted into cash using the following
exchange rate:
1 point = 50 Cent
(i.e. 2 points = 1 Dollar)
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D.1.3 Experimental Instructions Liability Neutral
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment. Please do not to
talk to any other participant. Please turn off your mobile phone or put it into
flight mode.
2 Roles and 16 Rounds
This experiment consists of 16 Rounds, each of which has the same sequence
of decisions. The sequence of decisions is explained in detail below.
There are 2 roles in this experiment: Player A and Player B. At the beginning
of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to one role and remain in that
role throughout the experiment. On the first screen of the experiment you will
see which role you have been assigned to.
Player A always interacts with Player B. However, the pair will change after
each round, meaning that in each round you will interact with a different
participant (in the opposite role).
All participants receive exactly the same information regarding the rules of the
game, including information about costs and payoffs of both players.
Overview of the Sequence of Decisions in a Round
Each round consists of a maximum of 4 decisions, which are made sequentially.
Decisions 1, 3 and 4 are made by Player A, Decision 2 is made by Player B. At
the start of the round Player B is randomly assigned a type (Type I or Type
II).
Sequence of Decisions in a Round (in short)
1. Player A chooses a price for Action I and a price for Action II.
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2. Player B is informed about the prices chosen by Player A. Player B then
decides whether they want to interact with Player A.
3. Player A (but not Player B) is informed about the type of Player B. Then
Player A is asked to choose either Action I or Action II.
4. Player A charges one of the prices specified in Decision 1. The price
charged does not necessarily have to be the price for the action actually
chosen by Player A in Decision 3, it can also be the price of the other
action.
5. The results of this round, based on the decisions of Player A and Player
B, will be announced.
Detailed Description of the Decisions and their
Consequences in Terms of Payoffs
Decision 1
Player A will later choose between two actions, Action I and Action II.
For Action I Player A incurs costs of 2 points (=experimental currency).
For Action II Player A incurs costs of 6 points.
Player A can charge prices for these actions from Player B. In Decision 1
Player A has to set the prices (in points) for both actions. Both prices have
to be positive integers between 1 and 11, i.e., only 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 or
11 are valid prices. Also, the price for Action I must not exceed the price for
Action II.
Decision 2
Player B is informed about the prices set by Player A for the two actions in
Decision 1. Then Player B decides whether they want to interact with Player
A.
If Player B decides not to interact, the round ends and both players receive
a payoff of 1.6 points for this round.
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If Player B decides to interact, Player A can choose an action in Decision 3 and
charge a price for this action in Decision 4. Player B is not able to observe
which action is chosen by Player A.
Decision 3
At the beginning of the round Player B was randomly assigned a type. Player
B can be one of two types: Type I or Type II.
Player B is with a 50% of Type I and with a 50% of Type II. Imagine that
a coin is tossed for each Player B in each round. If the coin comes up “heads”,
Player B is of Type I, if it comes up as “tails”, Player B is of Type II.
Player A is informed about the type of Player B before they enter Decision
3. Then Player A chooses an action for Player B, either Action I or Action II.
Player A can choose between the following possibilities:
• If Player B is of Type I, Player A can either choose Action I or Action II.
• If Player B is of Type II, Player A can only choose Action II.
Player B will never be informed whether they are of Type I or Type II or which
action Player A has chosen.
Decision 4
Player A charges Player B one of the two prices specified in Decision 1 for
the two actions. This price does not have to be the price of the action actually
chosen in Decision 3, but could also be the price of the other action.
Payoffs
If Player B chooses not to interact with Player A (decision “Don’t interact”
by Player B) both players get 1.6 points for the round.
Otherwise (decision “Interact” by Player B) the payoffs are as follows:
Player A receives the price (denoted in points) charged in Decision 4 minus
the costs for the action chosen in Decision 3.
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Player B receives 10 points minus the price charged in Decision 4.
At the beginning of the experiment you receive an initial endowment of 10
points. You are able to cover losses that might occur in some rounds with
this initial endowment. Furthermore, losses can also be compensated by gains
in other rounds. If your total payoff is negative at the end of the experiment,
you will have to pay this amount to the supervisor of the experiment. By
participating in this experiment you agree to this condition. Please note that it
is always possible to avoid losses in this experiment.
To calculate your total earnings the initial endowment and the profits from all
rounds are added up. This sum is then converted into cash using the following
exchange rate:
1 point = 50 Cent
(i.e. 2 points = 1 Dollar)
D.1.4 Experimental Instructions Liability Medical
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment. Please do not to
talk to any other participant. Please turn off your mobile phone or put it into
flight mode.
2 Roles and 16 Rounds
This experiment consists of 16 Rounds, each of which has the same sequence
of decisions. The sequence of decisions is explained in detail below.
There are 2 roles in this experiment: Doctors and Patients. At the beginning
of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to one role and remain in that
role throughout the experiment. On the first screen of the experiment you will
see which role you have been assigned to.
A doctor always interacts with a patient. However, the pair will change after
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each round, meaning that in each round you will interact with a different
participant (in the opposite role).
All participants receive exactly the same information regarding the rules of the
game, including information about costs and payoffs of both players.
Overview of the Sequence of Decisions in a Round
Each round consists of a maximum of 4 decisions, which are made sequentially.
Decisions 1, 3 and 4 are made by doctors; Decision 2 is made by patients. In
each round, a patient has either a minor or a severe illness. Without knowing
the gravity of their illness, a patient has to decide if they want to be examined
by a doctor or not. If a patient seeks an examination, a doctor will then perform
a diagnosis by which they can determine the gravity of the illness for certain.
Following the diagnosis a doctor will then administer a normal or a special
intravenous drip to a patient.
Sequence of Decisions in a Round (in short)
1. The doctor chooses a price for the normal intravenous drip and a price for
the special intravenous drip.
2. The patient is informed about the prices chosen by the doctor. The patient
then decides whether they want to be examined by the doctor.
3. If the doctor performs a diagnosis, then the doctor (however not the
patient) learns for certain if the patient has the minor or severe illness.
The doctor then selects the normal or the special intravenous drip.
4. The doctor charges from the patients one of the prices specified in Decision
1. The price charged does not necessarily have to be the price for the
intravenous drip actually chosen by the doctor in Decision 3, it can also
be the price of the other intravenous drip.
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5. The results of this round, based on the decisions of the doctor and the
patient, will be announced.
Detailed Description of the Decisions and their
Consequences in Terms of Payoffs
Decision 1
The doctor will later choose between two infusions, the normal and special
intravenous drip.
For the normal intravenous drip doctors incur costs of 2 points (=experi-
mental currency).
For the special intravenous drip doctors incur costs of 6 points.
Doctors can charge prices for these infusions from patients. In Decision 1 the
doctor has to set the price (in points) for both infusions. Both prices have
to be positive integers between 1 and 11, i.e., only 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
or 11 are valid prices. Also, the price for the normal intravenous drip must not
exceed the price for the special intravenous drip.
Decision 2
The patient is informed about the prices set by the doctor for the two infusions
in Decision 1. Then the patient decides whether they want to be examined by
the doctor.
If the patient decides not to be examined, the round ends and both partici-
pants receive a payoff of 1.6 points for this round.
If the patient decides to be examined, the doctor can choose an intravenous drip
in Decision 3 and charge a price for this intravenous drip in Decision 4. The
patient is not able to observe which intravenous drip is chosen by the doctor.
Decision 3
At the beginning of the round a patient was randomly assigned an illness. A
patient can have one of two illnesses: the minor illness or the severe ill-
ness.
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Patients have with a 50% chance the minor illness and with a 50% chance
the severe illness. Imagine that a coin is tossed for each patient in each round.
If the coin comes up “heads”, the patient has the minor illness, if it comes up
as “tails”, the patient has the severe illness.
The doctor is informed about the illness of the patient before they enter
Decision 3. Then the doctor chooses an intravenous drip for the patient, either
the normal intravenous drip or the special intravenous drip.
A doctor can choose between the following possibilities:
• If the patient has the minor illness, the doctor can either administer the
normal or the special intravenous drip.
• If the patient has the severe illness, the doctor can only administer the
special intravenous drip.
The patient will never be informed whether they have the minor illness or the
severe illness and which intravenous drip the doctor administered.
Decision 4
The Doctor charges the patient one of the two prices specified in Decision 1
for the infusions. This price does not have to be the price of the intravenous
drip actually chosen in Decision 3, but could also be the price of the other
intravenous drip.
Payoffs
If the patient chooses not to be examined by the doctor (decision “No exam-
ination” by the patient) both players get 1.6 points for the round.
Otherwise (decision “Examination” by the patient) the payoffs are as follows:
The doctor receives the price (denoted in points) charged in Decision 4 minus
the costs for the intravenous drip administered in Decision 3.
The patient receives 10 points minus the price charged in Decision 4.
D.1 Experimental Instructions 160
At the beginning of the experiment you receive an initial endowment of 10
points. You are able to cover losses that might occur in some rounds with this
initial endowment. Furthermore, losses can also be compensated by gains in
other rounds. If your total payoff is negative at the end of the experiment, you
will have to pay this amount to the supervisor of the experiment. By partic-
ipating in this experiment you agree to this condition. Please note that it is
always possible to avoid losses in this experiment.
To calculate your total earnings the initial endowment and the profits from all
rounds are added up. This sum is then converted into cash using the following
exchange rate:
1 point = 50 Cent
(i.e. 2 points = 1 Dollar)
D.1 Experimental Instructions 161
D.1.5 Experimental Instructions Verifiability Neutral
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment. Please do not to
talk to any other participant until the end of the experiment. Please turn off
your mobile phone or put it into flight mode.
2 Roles and 16 Rounds
This experiment consists of 16 Rounds, each of which has the same sequence
of decisions. The sequence of decisions is explained in detail below.
There are 2 roles in this experiment: Player A and Player B. At the beginning
of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to one role and remain in that
role throughout the experiment. On the first screen of the experiment you will
see which role you have been assigned to.
Player A always interacts with Player B. However, the pair will change after
each round, meaning that in each round you will interact with a different
participant (in the opposite role).
All participants receive exactly the same information regarding the rules of the
game, including information about costs and payoffs of both players.
Overview of the Sequence of Decisions in a Round
Each round consists of a maximum of 3 decisions, which are made sequentially.
Decisions 1 and 3 are made by Player A, Decision 2 is made by Player B. At the
start of the round Player B is randomly assigned a type (Type I or Type II).
Sequence of Decisions in a Round (in short)
1. Player A chooses a price for Action I and a price for Action II.
2. Player B is informed about the prices chosen by Player A. Player B then
decides whether they want to interact with Player A.
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3. Player A (but not Player B) is informed about the type of Player B. Then
Player A is asked to choose either Action I or Action II. Player B has to
pay the previously chosen price for the respective Action.
4. The results of this round, based on the decisions of Player A and Player
B, will be announced.
Detailed Description of the Decisions and their
Consequences in Terms of Payoffs
Decision 1
Player A will later choose between two actions, Action I and Action II.
For Action I Player A incurs costs of 2 points (=experimental currency).
For Action II Player A incurs costs of 6 points.
Player A can charge prices for these actions from Player B. In Decision 1
Player A has to set the prices (in points) for both actions. Both prices have
to be positive integers between 1 and 11, i.e., only 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 or
11 are valid prices. Also, the price for Action I must not exceed the price for
Action II.
Decision 2
Player B is informed about the prices set by Player A for the two actions in
Decision 1. Then Player B decides whether they want to interact with Player
A.
If Player B decides not to interact, the round ends and both players receive
a payoff of 1.6 points for this round.
If Player B decides to interact, Player A can choose an action in Decision 3 and
charge the specified price for this action.
Decision 3
At the beginning of the round Player B was randomly assigned a type. Player
B can be one of two types: Type I or Type II.
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Player B is with a 50% of Type I and with a 50% of Type II. Imagine that
a coin is tossed for each Player B in each round. If the coin comes up “heads”,
Player B is of Type I, if it comes up as “tails”, Player B is of Type II.
Player A is informed about the type of Player B before they enter Decision
3. Then Player A chooses an action for Player B, either Action I or Action II.
An action is sufficient under the following conditions:
• Player B is of Type I and Player A either chooses Action I or Action II.
• Player B is of Type II and Player A chooses Action II..
An action is insufficient, if Player B is of Type II and Player A chooses Action
I.
Player B receives 10 points, if Player A did choose a sufficient action.
Player B receives 0 points if Player A did choose an insufficient action.
Player B will never be informed whether they are of Type I or Type II or which
action Player A has chosen.
Player A charges from Player B the price specified in Decision 1 for the actions
chosen in Decision 3.
Payoffs
If Player B chooses not to interact with Player A (decision “Don’t interact”
by Player B) both players get 1.6 points for the round.
Otherwise (decision “Interact” by Player B) the payoffs are as follows:
Player A receives the price (denoted in points) specified in Decision 1 (for the
action chosen in Decision 3) minus the costs for the action chosen in Decision
3.
Player B’s payoff depends on whether the action chosen by Player A in Decision
D.1 Experimental Instructions 164
3 was sufficient.
• If the action chosen by Player A was sufficient, Player B receives 10 points
minus the price specified in Decision 1 for the action chosen in Decision 3.
• If the action chosen was insufficient, Player B has to pay the price for the
action chosen in Decision 3.
At the beginning of the experiment you receive an initial endowment of 10
points. You are able to cover losses that might occur in some rounds with
this initial endowment. Furthermore, losses can also be compensated by gains
in other rounds. If your total payoff is negative at the end of the experiment,
you will have to pay this amount to the supervisor of the experiment. By
participating in this experiment you agree to this condition. Please note that it
is always possible to avoid losses in this experiment.
To calculate your total earnings the initial endowment and the profits from all
rounds are added up. This sum is then converted into cash using the following
exchange rate:
1 point = 50 Cent
(i.e. 2 points = 1 Dollar)
D.1.6 Experimental Instructions Verifiability Medical
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment. Please do not to
talk to any other participant until the end of the experiment. Please turn off
your mobile phone or put it into flight mode.
2 Roles and 16 Rounds
This experiment consists of 16 Rounds, each of which has the same sequence
of decisions. The sequence of decisions is explained in detail below.
There are 2 roles in this experiment: Doctors and Patients. At the beginning
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of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to one role and remain in that
role throughout the experiment. On the first screen of the experiment you will
see which role you have been assigned to.
A doctor always interacts with a patient. However, the pair will change after
each round, meaning that in each round you will interact with a different
participant (in the opposite role).
All participants receive exactly the same information regarding the rules of the
game, including information about costs and payoffs of both players.
Overview of the Sequence of Decisions in a Round
Each round consists of a maximum of 3 decisions, which are made sequentially.
Decisions 1 and 3 are made by doctors; Decision 2 is made by patients. In each
round, a patient has either a minor or a severe illness. Without knowing the
gravity of their illness, a patient has to decide if they want to be examined by
a doctor or not. If a patient seeks an examination, a doctor will then perform
a diagnosis by which they can determine the gravity of the illness for certain.
Following the diagnosis a doctor will then administer a normal or a special
intravenous drip to a patient.
Sequence of Decisions in a Round (in short)
1. The doctor chooses a price for the normal intravenous drip and a price for
the special intravenous drip.
2. The patient is informed about the prices chosen by the doctor. The patient
then decides whether they want to be examined by the doctor.
3. If the doctor performs a diagnosis, then the doctor (however not the
patient) learns for certain if the patient has the minor or severe illness. The
doctor then selects the normal or the special intravenous drip. The patient
has to pay the previously chosen price for the respective intravenous drip.
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4. The results of this round, based on the decisions of the doctor and the
patient, will be announced.
Detailed Description of the Decisions and their
Consequences in Terms of Payoffs
Decision 1
The doctor will later choose between two infusions, the normal and special
intravenous drip.
For the normal intravenous drip doctors incur costs of 2 points (=experi-
mental currency).
For the special intravenous drip doctors incur costs of 6 points.
Doctors can charge prices for these infusions from patients. In Decision 1 the
doctor has to set the price (in points) for both infusions. Both prices have
to be positive integers between 1 and 11, i.e., only 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
or 11 are valid prices. Also, the price for the normal intravenous drip must not
exceed the price for the special intravenous drip.
Decision 2
The patient is informed about the prices set by the doctor for the two infusions
in Decision 1. Then the patient decides whether they want to be examined by
the doctor.
If the patient decides not to be examined, the round ends and both partici-
pants receive a payoff of 1.6 points for this round.
If the patient decides to be examined, the doctor can choose an intravenous drip
in Decision 3 and charge the specified price for this intravenous drip.
Decision 3
At the beginning of the round a patient was randomly assigned an illness. A
patient can have one of two illnesses: the minor illness or the severe illness.
Patients have with a 50% chance the minor illness and with a 50% chance
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the severe illness. Imagine that a coin is tossed for each patient in each round.
If the coin comes up “heads”, the patient has the minor illness, if it comes up
as “tails”, the patient has the severe illness.
The doctor is informed about the illness of the patient before they enter
Decision 3. Then the doctor chooses an intravenous drip for the patient, either
the normal intravenous drip or the special intravenous drip.
An intravenous drip is sufficient under the following conditions:
• The patient has the minor illness and the doctor either administers the
normal or the special intravenous drip.
• The patient has the severe illness and the doctor administers the special
intravenous drip.
An intravenous drip is insufficient, if the patient has the severe illness and the
doctor administered the normal intravenous drip.
The patient receives 10 points, if the doctor administered a sufficient in-
travenous drip. The patient receives 0 points if the doctor administered an
insufficient intravenous drip.
The patient will never be informed whether they have the minor illness or the
severe illness and which intravenous drip the doctor administered.
The doctor charges from the patient the price specified in Decision 1 for the
intravenous drip chosen in Decision 3.
Payoffs
If the patient chooses not to be examined by the doctor (decision “No exam-
ination” by the patient) both players get 1.6 points for the round.
Otherwise (decision “Examination” by the patient) the payoffs are as follows:
The doctor receives the price (denoted in points) specified in Decision 1 (for
the intravenous drip chosen in Decision 3) minus the costs for the intravenous
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drip administered in Decision 3.
The patients payoff depends on whether the intravenous drip administered by
the doctor in Decision 3 was sufficient.
• If the intravenous drip administered by the doctor was sufficient, the pa-
tient receives 10 points minus the price specified in Decision 1 for the
intravenous drip chosen in Decision 3.
• If the intravenous drip administered was insufficient, the patient has to
pay the price for the intravenous drip chosen in Decision 3.
At the beginning of the experiment you receive an initial endowment of
10 points. You are able to cover losses that might occur in some rounds with
this initial endowment. Furthermore, losses can also be compensated by gains
in other rounds. If your total payoff is negative at the end of the experiment,
you will have to pay this amount to the supervisor of the experiment. By
participating in this experiment you agree to this condition. Please note that it
is always possible to avoid losses in this experiment.
To calculate your total earnings the initial endowment and the profits from all
rounds are added up. This sum is then converted into cash using the following
exchange rate:
1 point = 50 Cent
(i.e. 2 points = 1 Dollar)
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D.1.7 Experimental Instructions Triple Experiment
Task 1
This task consists of 10 Rounds each of which has the same sequence of deci-
sions. The sequence of decisions is explained in detail below. There are 2 roles
in this task: Doctors and Patients. At the beginning of the task you will be
randomly assigned to one role and remain in that role throughout the task. On
the first screen of the task you will see which role you have been assigned to.
A doctor always interacts with a patient. However, the pair will change after
each round, meaning that in each round you will interact with a different par-
ticipant (in the opposite role).
Overview of the Sequence of Decisions in a Round
Each round consists of a maximum of 4 decisions, which are made sequentially.
Decisions 1, 3 and 4 are made by doctors; Decision 2 is made by patients. In
each round, a patient has either a minor or a severe illness. Without knowing
the gravity of their illness, a patient has to decide if they want to be examined
by a doctor or not. If a patient seeks an examination, a doctor will then perform
a diagnosis by which they can determine the gravity of the illness for certain.
Following the diagnosis a doctor will then administer a normal or a special in-
travenous drip to a patient.
Description of the Decisions and their Consequences in
Terms of Payoffs
Decision 1 (Doctors)
The doctor will later choose between two infusions, the normal and special
intravenous drip.
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For the normal intravenous drip doctors incur costs of 100 lab$.
For the special intravenous drip doctors incur costs of 300 lab$.
Doctors can charge prices for these infusions from patients. In Decision 1 the
doctor has to set the price (in lab$) for both infusions. Both prices have to
be positive multiples of 50 between 50 and 550, i.e., only 50, 100, 150, 200, 250,
300, 350, 400, 450, 500 or 550 are valid prices. Also, the price for the normal
intravenous drip must not exceed the price for the special intravenous drip.
Decision 2 (Patients)
The patient is informed about the prices set by the doctor for the two infusions
in Decision 1. Then the patient decides whether they want to be examined by
the doctor.
If the patient decides not to be examined, the round ends and both partici-
pants receive a payoff of 80 lab$ for this round.
If the patient decides to be examined, the doctor can choose an intravenous drip
in Decision 3 and charge a price for this intravenous drip in Decision 4. The
patient is not able to observe which intravenous drip is chosen by the doctor.
Decision 3 (Doctors)
At the beginning of the round a patient was randomly assigned an illness. A
patient can have one of two illnesses: the minor illness or the severe illness.
Patients have with a 50% chance the minor illness and with a 50% chance
the severe illness. Imagine that a coin is tossed for each patient in each round.
If the coin comes up “heads”, the patient has the minor illness, if it comes up
as “tails”, the patient has the severe illness. The doctor is informed about
the illness of the patient when they enter Decision 3. Then the doctor chooses
an intravenous drip for the patient, either the normal intravenous drip or the
special intravenous drip.
An intravenous drip is sufficient under the following conditions:
• The patient has the minor illness and the doctor either administers the
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normal or the special intravenous drip.
• The patient has the severe illness and the doctor administers the special
intravenous drip.
An intravenous drip is insufficient, if the patient has the severe illness and
the doctor administered the normal intravenous drip.
The patient receives 500 lab$ minus the price charged in Decision 4, if the
doctor administered a sufficient intravenous drip. The patient receives 0
lab$ minus the price charged in Decision 4, if the doctor administered an in-
sufficient intravenous drip.
The patient will never be informed whether they have the minor illness or the
severe illness and which intravenous drip the doctor administered.
Decision 4 (Doctors)
The Doctor charges the patient one of the two prices specified in Decision 1
for the infusions. This price does not have to be the price of the intravenous
drip actually chosen in Decision 3, but could also be the price of the other
intravenous drip.
Task 2
This task consists of 10 Rounds each of which has the same sequence of deci-
sions. In this task you are responsible for making a production decision as the
owner of a chemical production company. When you produce chemicals, there
is a chance that a chemical spill will occur. Your production decision directly
affects the probability of a chemical spill. Reducing the probability of a chemi-
cal spill is costly and will reduce your production earnings. Similarly increasing
the probability of a chemical spill will increase your production earnings.
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Description of the Decisions and their Consequences in
Terms of Payoffs
You will receive your production earnings regardless of whether a chemical
spill occurs. However there is a chance that you will be inspected. If you
are inspected and if a chemical spill occurred, then you will incur a fine. The
probability that you will be inspected is 50% and if a chemical spill has
occurred then you have to pay a fine of 75lab$.
The options below show you the relationship between the probability of a chemi-
cal spill and your production earnings. For example if you choose the probability
of a chemical spill to be 50%, then your production earnings are equal to 107
lab$. If a chemical spill occurs and you are inspected, you would have to pay a
fine of 75 lab$. Your earnings in this case would be 107 - 75 = 32 lab$. This
occurs 20% of the time (0.5*0.4 = 20%). In the remaining 80% of the cases you
would earn 107 lab$.
Please choose one of the following options:
 100% accident probability and production earnings of 138 lab$
 80% accident probability and production earnings of 132 lab$
 60% accident probability and production earnings of 123 lab$
 40% accident probability and production earnings of 107 lab$
 20% accident probability and production earnings of 76 lab$
You will pay a fine of 75 lab$ if a chemical spill occurs and if you are inspected.
Otherwise you will not pay a fine and you will earn 107 lab$.
Whether or not you have a chemical spill will be determined by the com-
puter in accordance with your chosen accident probability and is indepen-
dent across rounds. This means that whether or not you have a chemical spill
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this period is not affected by what happened last period. Similarly whether
you are inspected or not is also determined by the computer and is not
affected by previous inspection outcomes.
In addition, you will be asked to fill in a report about whether an accident
has occurred or not. If you report that you had an accident, you will pay
a self-reporting fine of 60 lab$. If you report that you have not had an
accident, you will be inspected with 50% probability and fined 75 lab$
if an accident did occur.
Task 3
This task consists of 10 rounds each of which has the same sequence of de-
cisions. In this task you are responsible for making tax declaration decisions.
Each round represents one year and proceeds in three stages. All the informa-
tion to make an informed decision will be provided on the screen.
For this task you will be grouped together with 4 other participants. Please
know that the tax revenue is redistributed to the members of your group.
Declare your income
First Stage
You have been assigned an income of 100 lab$. This will represent your
taxable income for each of the following rounds (years). There is a universal
tax rate of 30%, you will only be taxed on the amount of income you declare
each round.
Tax calculation and audit
Second Stage
In the second stage each year, the taxes payable on your declared income will
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be deducted from your income. Your net income accumulates as ’wealth’. In
this stage, there is also a 10% chance that you will be selected for audit,
and your declared income will be checked against your real income in this year.
If there is a discrepancy between your stated and your real income, a fine of
1.5 times the amount of undeclared income will be deducted from your
income this year on top of all taxes owed.
Tax Income redistribution
Third Stage
Finally, every group member will receive a transfer, which is the sum of the tax
contributions of all members of the group multiplied by 1.6 and divided by the
number of group members (4). So if the amount of taxes (i.e. the sum of tax
payments of all members of the group) is 30 lab$, each group member receives
a transfer payment of 12 lab$ (= 30 * 1.6 / 4).
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D.2 Print Screens
D.2.1 Print Screens Baseline Neutral
D.2.1.1 Player A & Player B
Figure D.2.1: Screenshot Instruction Baseline Neutral
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Figure D.2.2: Screenshot Player A / Decision 1
Figure D.2.3: Screenshot Player A / Decision 3 + 4
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Figure D.2.4: Screenshot Player A / Result
Figure D.2.5: Screenshot Player B / Decision 2
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Figure D.2.6: Screenshot Player B / Result
Figure D.2.7: Screenshot Player A & Player B / Final Screen
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D.2.1.2 Print Screen When Outside Option was Chosen
Figure D.2.8: Screenshot Player A & Player B / Outside Option
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D.2.2 Print Screens Baseline Medical
D.2.2.1 Doctor & Patient
Figure D.2.9: Screenshot Instruction Baseline Medical
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Figure D.2.10: Screenshot Doctor / Decision 1
Figure D.2.11: Screenshot Doctor / Decision 3 + 4
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Figure D.2.12: Screenshot Doctor / Result
Figure D.2.13: Screenshot Patient / Decision 2
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Figure D.2.14: Screenshot Patient / Result
Figure D.2.15: Screenshot Doctor & Patient / Final Screen
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D.2.2.2 Print Screen When Outside Option was Chosen
Figure D.2.16: Screenshot Doctor & Patient / Outside Option
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D.2.3 Print Screens Liability Neutral
D.2.3.1 Player A & Player B
Figure D.2.17: Screenshot Instruction Liability Neutral
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Figure D.2.18: Screenshot Player A / Decision 1
Figure D.2.19: Screenshot Player A / Decision 3 + 4
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Figure D.2.20: Screenshot Player A / Result
Figure D.2.21: Screenshot Player B / Decision 2
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Figure D.2.22: Screenshot Player B / Result
Figure D.2.23: Screenshot Player A & Player B / Final Screen
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D.2.3.2 Print Screen When Outside Option was Chosen
Figure D.2.24: Screenshot Player A & Player B / Outside Option
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D.2.4 Print Screens Liability Medical
D.2.4.1 Doctor & Patient
Figure D.2.25: Screenshot Instruction Liability Medical
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Figure D.2.26: Screenshot Doctor / Decision 1
Figure D.2.27: Screenshot Doctor / Decision 3 + 4
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Figure D.2.28: Screenshot Doctor / Result
Figure D.2.29: Screenshot Patient / Decision 2
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Figure D.2.30: Screenshot Patient / Result
Figure D.2.31: Screenshot Doctor & Patient / Final Screen
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D.2.4.2 Print Screen When Outside Option was Chosen
Figure D.2.32: Screenshot Doctor & Patient / Outside Option
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D.2.5 Print Screens Verifiability Neutral
D.2.5.1 Player A & Player B
Figure D.2.33: Screenshot Instruction Verifiability Neutral
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Figure D.2.34: Screenshot Player A / Decision 1
Figure D.2.35: Screenshot Player A / Decision 3 + 4
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Figure D.2.36: Screenshot Player A / Result
Figure D.2.37: Screenshot Player B / Decision 2
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Figure D.2.38: Screenshot Player B / Result
Figure D.2.39: Screenshot Player A & Player B / Final Screen
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D.2.5.2 Print Screen When Outside Option was Chosen
Figure D.2.40: Screenshot Player A & Player B / Outside Option
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D.2.6 Print Screens Verifiability Medical
D.2.6.1 Doctor & Patient
Figure D.2.41: Screenshot Instruction Verifiability Medical
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Figure D.2.42: Screenshot Doctor / Decision 1
Figure D.2.43: Screenshot Doctor / Decision 3 + 4
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Figure D.2.44: Screenshot Doctor / Result
Figure D.2.45: Screenshot Patient / Decision 2
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Figure D.2.46: Screenshot Patient / Result
Figure D.2.47: Screenshot Doctor & Patient / Final Screen
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D.2.6.2 Print Screen When Outside Option was Chosen
Figure D.2.48: Screenshot Doctor & Patient / Outside Option
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D.2.7 Print Screens Triple Experiment
Figure D.2.49: Screenshot General Instruction
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Figure D.2.50: Screenshot Task 1 - Instruction
Figure D.2.51: Screenshot Understanding Instruction
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Figure D.2.52: Screenshot Task 1 - Credence Decision 1
Figure D.2.53: Screenshot Task 1 - Credence Decision 2
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Figure D.2.54: Screenshot Task 1 - Credence Decision 3 + 4
Figure D.2.55: Screenshot Task 1 - Credence Result Doctor
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Figure D.2.56: Screenshot Task 1 - Credence Result Patient
Figure D.2.57: Screenshot Task 1 - Credence Outside Option
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Figure D.2.58: Screenshot Task 2 - Self-Reporting Instruction
Figure D.2.59: Screenshot Understanding Instruction
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Figure D.2.60: Screenshot Self-Reporting Task - Production Decision
Figure D.2.61: Screenshot Self-Reporting Task - Did have Chemical Spill
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Figure D.2.62: Screenshot Self-Reporting Task - Payoff after Chemical Spill
Figure D.2.63: Screenshot Task 3 - Tax Instruction
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Figure D.2.64: Screenshot Understanding Instruction
Figure D.2.65: Screenshot Task 3 - Tax Declaration
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Figure D.2.66: Screenshot Task 3 - Tax Audit
Figure D.2.67: Screenshot Task 3 - Tax Outcome
